MALICIOUS
216
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment
T1059.007 JavaScript
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution
The PDF document contains a lure for recovery secrets or private keys, indicating a phishing attempt. It also includes external URIs, one of which is a suspicious domain related to Cisco router firmware, suggesting a targeted attack. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier further support its malicious nature, likely involving exploitation for client execution.
Machine Learning
- Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9992
Heuristics 6
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Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARMSmall PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
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Recovery secret / private key request critical SE_SECRET_RECOVERY_LUREDocument requests recovery phrases, private keys, backup codes, or saved passwords. Requests for these secrets in a document are high-risk.
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ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTIONClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
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External URI info PDF_URIPDF contains an external URL action
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Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTALThe same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL https://zajinet.ru/strik?utm_term=cisco+rv320+alternative+firmware
- https://cdn.sqhk.co/borefigux/b4jhvgc/88366811109.pdf
- https://cdn.sqhk.co/zudilubal/Ejjgjhj/mirrors_for_sale_amazon.pdf
- http://nuveclovet.xyz/programa_para_monitorear_redes_gratisl5e60.pdf
- http://xigujawuruwuko.22web.org/11714556600.pdf
- http://rukozhop-guide.com/wogedefuxopivufanurtxkuz.pdf
- https://cdn.sqhk.co/batumozi/dxeheia/butajixad.pdf
- http://www.ascendercorp.com/
- http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
- http://www.daltonmaag.com/
- https://348ddb29-83e1-4812-94a1-743b72ef9b42.filesusr.com/ugd/23b571_2a091734384b46409eae6ecc2cc0791e.pdf?index=true
- http://dagarawixet.epizy.com/basic_beverage_knowledge.pdf
- https://s3.amazonaws.com/xokebore/litasokezakepaxoxorom.pdf
- https://s3.amazonaws.com/tezofuretejom/gofimopoxosedoneb.pdf
- https://s3.amazonaws.com/wusone/37015420688.pdf
- http://marojinoz.rf.gd/angle_relationships_equations_worksheet.pdf
- https://ff4d9611-e7ea-45f2-85d3-f0b464ef817f.filesusr.com/ugd/48f461_b8f597458f07432ebea9b9ad28a7abd3.pdf?index=true
- https://5b5cf7c4-d983-4e27-bd54-44d52fc9074e.filesusr.com/ugd/2f9450_5eb6405d5cdc40308fcd2d2b1d80f964.pdf?index=true
- http://witosef.rf.gd/jozerolufe.pdf
- https://s3.amazonaws.com/vawoginele/78149579433.pdf
- https://s3.amazonaws.com/midaguvimabof/how_much_oil_does_a_5.7_hemi_take.pdf
- https://s3.amazonaws.com/makumapikeze/94238013826.pdf
- https://2e5cbe44-7de3-4e3f-b94c-8a8567814465.filesusr.com/ugd/f96b02_2de4ebde2f374909b419210f69d3bb6d.pdf?index=true
- https://s3.amazonaws.com/kikunojulejuj/17290023390.pdf
- https://s3.amazonaws.com/wulagisi/49048933496.pdf
- https://901c4554-6fda-40bf-8344-1f1538f5dc06.filesusr.com/ugd/a76634_d486790573434fefb1c74afd68bace23.pdf?index=true
- http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
- http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
- http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
- http://scripts.sil.org/OFL
Extracted artifacts 3
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
font_00_sfnt_off00017a41.bin585968c4d03fd2627099afd4ab23c7c2084d45bb5bff25109282f39539c36d6a |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x17A41 | 5428 bytes |
font_01_sfnt_off00018ca1.bin6f0c8a9b286a2210f01fe0499b35ea47499d2c4f32120ad7af7c39f91454b8e5 |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x18CA1 | 10980 bytes |
font_02_sfnt_off0001b210.binb50a2106bf82917db0cd3cf88f63c5e8cc3298b343ace5cffc591b35df33d24c |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1B210 | 4324 bytes |
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