Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 36505e343c0eea5e…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

3.8 KB
MD5: 02c5f2b42795f3a21f92cc169029c54e SHA-1: 6065b1968cd2f6df83cd218b3018ba2c965865fa SHA-256: 36505e343c0eea5e291f141a3100f65123832b8e6d03c19d91b367dd340e0754
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1559.002 Component Object Model Hijacking

The RTF document contains embedded OLE object data and specifically triggers the Equation Editor vulnerability. The ".objupdate" directive forces the activation of this embedded object, leading to the exploitation of the Equation Editor component to execute arbitrary code. No further stages or IOCs were identified in the static analysis.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000bd.bin
27e450424eed55e188c3a70bf35d84800e21dfee456f594beca0a341ccf01045
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xBD 1687 bytes