Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 364899fa099e7386…

MALICIOUS

RTF

89.5 KB First seen: 2024-07-24
MD5: 665c9e9783911d6a26d96c390eda2180 SHA-1: 816c32be45fb350f87d5f928dbe84c4f074e7b04 SHA-256: 364899fa099e7386d61a4d323dde9727b74ba7b737decbd93e3756a36b73d0ae
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.001 PowerShell

The sample is an RTF document that contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, triggering heuristic firings for RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR and RTF_OBJUPDATE. This indicates an attempt to exploit a known vulnerability in the Equation Editor component to achieve code execution. The presence of OLE object data further supports this. The exact payload is not discernible from the provided evidence, but the exploit mechanism is clear.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001f65.bin
0c450a9d27de2c72e4bf44fa3338f14846dfb84abb8343e35b6eced991c52527
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1F65 1932 bytes