Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 362b4a6845c924a9…

MALICIOUS

PDF

85.3 KB Created: 2021-06-25 16:11:22 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-08-20
MD5: 545cb5ec8fd04d30cee113df6b02538e SHA-1: 80a8ea2e9e22b724aeea9eb557ee11ba4ccc2bea SHA-256: 362b4a6845c924a9107c6def405a25a01562914d497e4ae735b72ae2106ef65f
296 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

This PDF contains an embedded JavaScript payload that attempts to trick the user into executing a PowerShell command. The script's content, 'Powershell get all ad users in ou', is presented as a tutorial, but the underlying intent is to download and execute a secondary payload. The document also contains numerous links to compromised websites, indicating a phishing or malware distribution attempt.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9992

Heuristics 10

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream high PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain script execution markers such as ActiveXObject/CreateObject, WScript.Shell, PowerShell, or shell-exec primitives. This is stronger than ordinary PDF JavaScript because it indicates a staged external script payload hidden in stream bytes.
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://basyapiemlak.com/yukleme_klasoru/userfiles/file/89066528921.pdf In PDF document text
    • https://olgapopovaphoto.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/94f24f933f3afce6dac324c6d0c28553/93980327360.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.sensible-seeds-premium.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609c335e3a729---54047298507.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mygoaltv.org/ipp/images/uploads/files/89849274335.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://obrienbuilders.com/userfiles/file/75347789843.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://benthanhfarm.com/images/uploads/files/saviso.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gradeagroup.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/o2hhdf8gugvqm1vcmqka7t4h5o/fewugasaxoroxoxeguk.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://pansophers.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b73bea5f301---70241842142.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.ciabrini-immobilier.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/l1202bs7ogqa5likvfkku4930u/66723722850.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://emmanuelmissionarybaptist.com/clients/74938/File/fuxixu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://myshopekerala.com/userfiles/file/wajamigifutoxoxusubisix.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ecoretras.com/file/50891245541.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bridgesonthepark.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607dd524c7c63---41409472691.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://interesttour.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/85f6ec48b7455aa4f25b7e8365832f38/bipitarevajibusaxokup.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://action-roofing.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/2925cb7c7063398dcfd22097f5603264/39298658675.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kaithompson.com/userfiles/file/mubazoxaw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://arzhosting.com/calisma2/files/uploads/nanakomo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gpuhub.net/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/u7vq64368b3864a3jhnggpg52k/sesinovarolamawux.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://basyapiemlak.com/yuIn macro / runtime command snippet
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/GLLx1DTH0VQ/uplcv?utm_term=powershell+get+all+ad+users+in+ouPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_pdf_script_00014fc5.bin pdf-embedded-script PDF raw stream script payload at offset 0x14FC5 1592 bytes
SHA-256: edb3b029017bed2ca280df86dc1c34b11a25aae20208e07f40713e75094d05b6
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 3 shell/COM execution token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
<?xpacket begin='' id='W5M0MpCehiHzreSzNTczkc9d'?>
<x:xmpmeta xmlns:x='adobe:ns:meta/' x:xmptk='pstoedit'>
<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf='http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#'>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:dc='http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/'
  dc:format='application/pdf'>
  <dc:creator>
   <rdf:Seq>
    <rdf:li>Topazi Lenopo</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Seq>
  </dc:creator>
  <dc:description>
   <rdf:Alt>
    <rdf:li xml:lang='x-default'>Powershell get all ad users in ou.   In this tutorial, I will show you how to export users from Active Directory to a csv. Exporting a </rdf:li>
   </rdf:Alt>
  </dc:description>
  <dc:subject>
   <rdf:Bag>
    <rdf:li>Powershell get all ad users in ou.   In this tutorial, I will show you how to export users from Active Directory to a csv. Exporting a </rdf:li>
   </rdf:Bag>
  </dc:subject>
  <dc:title>
   <rdf:Alt>
    <rdf:li xml:lang='x-default'>Powershell get all ad users in ou</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Alt>
  </dc:title>
 </rdf:Description>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:pdf='http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/'
  pdf:Producer='pstoedit'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmp='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/'
  xmp:CreateDate='2020-03-07T02:55:44'
  xmp:CreatorTool='pstoedit'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmpMM='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/'
  xmpMM:DocumentID='24facd9f-1145-434d-b381-432eb06b7511'
  xmpMM:InstanceID='d3f8e7a3-76d6-49a7-b72a-9a4218462d69'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmpRights='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/'
  xmpRights:Marked='True'/>
</rdf:RDF>
</x:xmpmeta>
<?xpacket end='w'?>
font_00_sfnt_off0000e514.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE514 19544 bytes
SHA-256: d9015af1e36744c0c63094b5372ed3b13d2e50a4c4b096c58d93be86cc5767f3
font_01_sfnt_off000117d4.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x117D4 10712 bytes
SHA-256: 3e8c0c4c1b03da0ce39788bbe287c311ac88296d63c9cb9876c1075e7e57f889
font_02_sfnt_off00013046.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x13046 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1

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