Malicious Office (OLE) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 359ec47c18e09724…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOC

106.5 KB Created: 2005-05-10 00:02:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Word 10.0
MD5: e1d695e4e146e76cefad269d1fd1e6ce SHA-1: d4165bce1fd9e32cecb3ed1460bec5d22e645dbd SHA-256: 359ec47c18e09724c231dde4eb90d99dff784cb1cd0243ab9584b706b88c7442
100 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information

The sample exhibits characteristics of malicious obfuscation techniques, specifically XOR-encoded strings with a key of 0x92 and a significant amount of slack space within the OLE structure. While a benign URL was extracted, these indicators point towards a deliberately hidden payload. No scripts were extracted, limiting further analysis of the specific malicious functionality.

Heuristics 3

  • XOR-encoded strings (key 0x92) critical SC_XOR_ENCODED
    Found 2 Windows library/API name(s) XOR-encoded with single-byte key 0x92: 'advapi32.dll', 'shell32.dll'
  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 109,056 bytes but its declared streams total only 12,812 bytes — 96,244 bytes (88%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main