Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3595b8c12981006d…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.8 KB
MD5: d88741d381fa8cf5bd7973ea5ecd7c80 SHA-1: 54551c06ced934f0a4a2e7fa28f1c5fc815dbbcc SHA-256: 3595b8c12981006d11c6b238298ccd90a06c40702d30bc49113965ead9abc4bb
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The RTF file contains embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering heuristics related to Equation Editor exploitation. The presence of ".objdata" and ".objupdate" directives strongly suggests an attempt to activate an embedded OLE object, likely to exploit a known vulnerability in the Equation Editor component. No scripts were extracted, and no document body was available for further context.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000009e.bin
e87f8edbba666a2a654b7f08a2ae7dca15c3b40b7b079eac1cecea32b27b988d
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x9E 2186 bytes