Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3571cbbb01a0d3f3…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

218.1 KB
MD5: 092408fa528759ea6f88c47d5577d3a1 SHA-1: 91f00be911e9a058fee1a723ae482050b2440b7a SHA-256: 3571cbbb01a0d3f39231ad8e32869b4d739fad87b2b9679f8e734011f979a70a
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The RTF document contains multiple embedded OLE objects, with specific heuristics indicating the use of `objdata` and `objupdate` directives. This strongly suggests an attempt to exploit OLE object handling to execute arbitrary code. The document body explicitly prompts the user to 'Enable Editing', a common lure for macro-based or embedded object execution. No scripts were extracted, but the OLE object structure points to a downloader or exploit delivery mechanism.

Heuristics 6

  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000ba2.bin
566c0a486e4e970f6bf6b4e4a1c6291c00480459e4c12296e616f05ac70004af
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xBA2 15544 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 shell/COM execution token(s).
objdata_01_off00008a8a.bin
893d8db8585190a273d0c7c3dcff2eb58184b866a3687a9319ca72a8284876cb
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x8A8A 2632 bytes
objdata_02_off0000a02d.bin
44deae4627fee3c44f54d5bd10477ec2e17f4c08135f08e2417832e36d10d037
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xA02D 12297 bytes