Office (OLE) malware analysis — malicious · 354db8b46ea16278

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

19.0 KB Created: 1993-09-28 16:08:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Word for Windows 95 First seen: 2012-06-14

MD5: 60453fedb5d50bd4c25569ef7466c2da SHA-1: 9f5a39ecb4c1d427a11a9318ed1731b92fdc1e5c SHA-256: 354db8b46ea16278c5ce97f46e9ca6dd3fc9c1392860a19e043940d49b62a158

160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1059.005 Visual Basic

The presence of a legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker ('autoopen') and critical heuristics indicating an embedded OLE object with parsing anomalies strongly suggest malicious intent. ClamAV detection as 'Win.Trojan.Minimal-32' further supports this. The document body content appears to be unrelated boilerplate text, likely used to obscure the malicious functionality.

Heuristics 4

ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Minimal-32 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION

ClamAV detected this file as malware: Win.Trojan.Minimal-32
Embedded Office document has suspicious static findings critical EMBEDDED_OFFICE_CHILD_STATIC_TRIAGE

A CFB/OLE Office document was found inside another file type and its carved contents matched Office exploit or payload heuristics. This catches wrapped exploit documents where the top-level file routes to a PE, archive, or generic scanner instead of Office.
Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC

OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
CFB header with no readable streams medium OLE_PARSE_EMPTY_STREAMS

The file begins with a valid OLE2/CFB header but exposes no directory streams. A non-empty compound document with an unreadable directory is anomalous — it is seen with truncated/corrupt files and, more importantly, with content deliberately shifted off byte boundaries to defeat parsers while the host application still recovers the object.

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`embedded_office_off00002100.ole`	embedded-office	Embedded OLE/CFB Office body inside ole container at offset 0x2100	11008 bytes
SHA-256: `f22ce497bcdd126c81f7b5c9affe3ddab3e228439b62d669ff8513c9ffa30d6e`

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