Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 35423879af97aa74…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

937.5 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel
MD5: 3f507483c69122665749c74957fecbcf SHA-1: 8fa0278a58eb2262edf9d5109653ab6225c4d030 SHA-256: 35423879af97aa746f2c25ba204b152e8eb36a45bd2e9cadfd9c77fe39ef1604
108 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The critical heuristic firing indicates exploitation of CVE-2017-0199 via an OLE2Link object, which attempts to load a remote resource from the URL 'https://gacorbos.me/LbNvGT?&picture=gigantic&goggles=loving&grapefruit=eager&receipt'. This suggests the file acts as a downloader for a secondary payload. The presence of a VBA macro and an embedded PDF further supports a multi-stage attack. The VBA macro itself contains no executable statements, but its presence alongside the OLE exploit is suspicious.

Heuristics 4

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings high POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.wowform.com
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00076e00.pdf
08616587398695efb57d3a7e0885157b87fb9cb2c34f970eab27d3abc733ace3		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x76E00 473088 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.