Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 350dd24a367d6b51…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

76.6 KB Created: 2021-03-17 05:38:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: 120c977c70d20b495a26014177b85304 SHA-1: 2c8b1be726724badb908709e443b10cd4b8b5ad0 SHA-256: 350dd24a367d6b51ec26610f3bc480d0da2df0c1c41668c5c4a8198ad96dd4b1
260 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.003 Windows Command Shell

The OOXML document contains a VBA project with an AutoOpen macro, which is a common technique for initial execution. The macro utilizes WScript.Shell and CreateObject to execute commands, likely to download and run a second-stage payload. The critical heuristics for Shell() and WScript.Shell usage strongly indicate malicious intent.

Heuristics 7

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains vbaProject.bin — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
6065e805a556205c95d3f4c803a22a45a1d263657ce4a9b8b3d4c8ebb9c734ba		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 3022 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
vbaProject_00.bin
f7436b246554c96ae13f0a78c88897981d0501ecf43b873c7ec0967d0aba10d6		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 30208 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved artifact contains 4 long base64-like blob(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.

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