Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 34ed0b46b7eec56b…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.0 KB
MD5: aabf74fd445aa4c8e8ffbcaddbf80a71 SHA-1: cdaacbb0b44fbd3d627be6f66e64d35e9d542e1b SHA-256: 34ed0b46b7eec56b12408e4e299a21cd2853ad677a2e401f0d23720afbc877be
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF file contains an embedded OLE object with a specific ProgID associated with the Equation Editor. The \objupdate directive indicates that the OLE object will be activated upon opening, triggering the exploitation of a known vulnerability in the Equation Editor. This is a common delivery mechanism for exploiting software vulnerabilities to achieve arbitrary code execution.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000043.bin
3bd2fc1f506375cfb5db3ad290d486df0593f4e1cc2b1418b2477d043824d9d6
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x43 1939 bytes