Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 34e74ec5f46a93a7…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

907.1 KB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: f70632c48e65bea5239367ee063f4e8a SHA-1: 6f2bdb5c265d972a43900d1ac5f6312101b8684a SHA-256: 34e74ec5f46a93a7ea5af3101c6f007a70be8b0561ed8a2f8aca705e730eaabb
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.001 PowerShell

The critical heuristic firings for RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR and CVE_2017_8759 strongly indicate exploitation of the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-8759). The presence of OLE object data and the objupdate command further support this, suggesting the embedded OLE object is activated to run malicious code. While no specific second-stage payload indicators were found, the exploit's nature points to code execution for further malicious activity.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000d91ba.bin
f9472ddc414572a74eb4f4b3b4d409f7c4e3d9894b8889a114765a1a32a2ba1d		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xD91BA 3739 bytes

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