Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 34d0f98cec02e362…

MALICIOUS

RTF

43.0 KB First seen: 2023-07-27
MD5: 50a7ad2ace11903c9d16a6c8660631de SHA-1: d67e713c65195405dd9a97034d15c7d8fa3b37bb SHA-256: 34d0f98cec02e36273e2e3fadfc535875acf7df8dc8e68b5a9b10ab74300cde9
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1059.005 Visual Basic

The RTF file contains an embedded OLE object with a specific Equation Editor ProgID, indicating an attempt to exploit a known vulnerability. The presence of \objupdate suggests that the object is designed to activate automatically or upon user interaction after enabling editing, as prompted by the document's lure. The heuristic SE_ENABLE_LURE confirms the presence of a user-facing prompt to enable editing, a common tactic for macro-based or exploit-laden documents.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000040f5.bin
26c612234b75b6debba980d463fb695be09ab6338372733cc1da54f5a31675d2
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x40F5 1985 bytes