Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 34d04128d270ee86…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

612.7 KB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: d3eb93c9105fb36ace6d200f488694e1 SHA-1: 0d99f60d1e441c04c5086c084940941e89e543f5 SHA-256: 34d04128d270ee86b61589db3ebb0b7c08a2c885e6bae6c9126a5db870667ff5
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1566 Phishing

The RTF document contains embedded OLE object data and specifically triggers the CVE-2017-8759 vulnerability through MSXML SAX OLE activation. This indicates the document is designed to exploit this known vulnerability, likely to download and execute a second-stage payload. The presence of RTF object data and the specific exploit targeted strongly suggest a malicious intent.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00094006.bin
01d338256cc5f4e29bfcd5243a3e7614d468701460c5d53050ffe8c870e5a2f2
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x94006 3739 bytes