Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 34c42a4d8148e202…

MALICIOUS

PDF

80.8 KB Created: 2021-09-08 21:46:18 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-11
MD5: dedcf3260d295ecabdc5911e967d7058 SHA-1: 847ed1f64eb62354c702e04abf780f72a348c993 SHA-256: 34c42a4d8148e202e1c17e7ab14448927cb92e85c9721ac411ceb201417586f0
176 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains numerous embedded URLs, many of which point to compromised or disposable hosting, suggesting a link farm designed to redirect users. The 'SE_QR_LURE' heuristic indicates the document may instruct users to scan a QR code, a common tactic in phishing campaigns. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent, likely for phishing or malware distribution.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9975

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • QR-code redirect lure medium SE_QR_LURE
    Document instructs the user to scan a QR code with a phone — consistent with QR phishing, but also common in legitimate documents
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://chcial.ru/uplcv?utm_term=how+do+i+scan+a+qr+code+on+my+iphone PDF link annotation
    • http://quanhoangtsi.com/upload/quangtri/files/bakokudimazoga.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ausafe.net/images/art/files/49506180466.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://leeclinic.kr/userData/board/file/jigikujemiwekawalosewen.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://baliretreatcenter.com/olabali_ci/media/images/newsfiles/purefilizozajupa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://self119.net/upload/userfiles/2021/09/files/210905060102.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nazragame.com/calisma2/files/uploads/pidizifunefiwe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://workontext.ru/media/file/10584892812.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://heureka-cz.eu/files/jivezipajolujudividunaki.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.1000ena.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16134dd2f3d9ac---29237556604.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://master-sign.ru/ckfinder/userfiles/files/55213225333.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ylwlgwadmin.ylwl.cn/upload/files/47920595653.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lacaune.hu/userfiles/file/23700347241.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://marksiegeldds.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/49fa40b3087c433f25e738fcd71e9e83/80865592696.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.waetsukai.jp/system/ckfinder/userfiles/files/83461950075.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dampinggame.com/calisma2/files/uploads/21564586095.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://baigeleather.com/userfiles/file/71399126818.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://balaji-technology.com/userfiles/file/vixugo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://hkbca.org/UploadFiles/file/20210903043146127.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.asoriofrio.org/ckfinder/userfiles/files/mejolagopivofodebazu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://stkvn.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/ff582a3ea16e4e834c7b9f841ea6278e/76748956471.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://aradmissions.com/ci/userfiles/files/1130358986.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://olguanaokulu.com/upload/file/72425373597.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://downtowncincyhotels.com/core_degree/admin/images/cms_imagesfiles/76290182390.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://qianxish.com/ckfind_image/files/29418818322.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000d682.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD682 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_01_sfnt_off0000ee94.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEE94 17724 bytes
SHA-256: 30f06ffdd4cb42119517033c48b5103c165cec72740520508c88c5d8c79cebe0
font_02_sfnt_off00011c57.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11C57 10972 bytes
SHA-256: 85ce7ab179955dd351c4838e8a2b9a2849fa631f2cb928fafea7a271804ddf8d

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