Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 34a8579bf1873fc8…

MALICIOUS

PDF

89.2 KB Created: 2021-07-05 03:44:23 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-09-13
MD5: f044ccc7f5930baa710966663a160d7d SHA-1: c8ed34e8792b9c9794ab88b710cc344442794836 SHA-256: 34a8579bf1873fc8c0308e4ac314494b9791d291747d1740d5da2a291d9dd02f
224 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains embedded JavaScript and a high number of external links, many pointing to compromised WordPress sites and disposable hosting, indicating a phishing or malware distribution attempt. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly suggest malicious intent, likely to exploit vulnerabilities or trick the user into downloading a second-stage payload.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9991

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link to algorithmically-generated URL high PDF_RANDOM_URL_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) link whose host looks algorithmically generated (pronounceable-random labels) and whose path/query carries a long high-entropy token. This is the randomized-redirector pattern of malspam phishing lures — the visible document is only a prompt — not a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Malformed active-content stream length medium PDF_MALFORMED_EXPLOIT_STREAM_LENGTH
    A PDF stream that carries active/exploit-looking content has a declared /Length that does not match the recovered stream body. Malformed stream boundaries and length mismatches are common parser-evasion/supporting evidence around Reader exploit streams.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://jikaramen.com/uploads/files/refudezi.pdf In PDF document text
    • https://securitydm.com/slicice/file/dukemajenetevalarox.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://cloverpark1959.com/clients/51168/File/82322531947.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bhavalaya.org/ckfinder/userfiles/files/biwulebiwugemaxuxib.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.alwaysflorida.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609b721a56b4c---64859277103.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.potterycommercials.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a1f30bbf1c4---watepetegotexitusu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pluckywize.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b2bd23ea163---49914138278.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bogelaipigeon.com/upload/file/sajesewuxapifip.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mission4recruitment.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608946fcd18e9---38264661443.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://chocoinmobiliario.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/ce5fc264d455ab01990b3657c55dd794/10636555751.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kaufdeinauto.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160d2ba152d8b8---38629896878.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.avenueroadadvertising.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608e3c9fbd007---12965476333.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://quaker1960.com/clients/3/34/346d0055920ff30d27c63167e405b0e7/File/gifuvukewulusitudeti.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ahcxdq.com/uploads/file/28175025695.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://reniuved.it/file/nojapaninitenesuw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://rorolaw.com/customer/3/d/9/3d947ad6ce2568d98b832ccf5548371bFile/52916467325.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://urgentcarepb.net/userfiles/file/16058820588.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://developmentassociationofnagaland.org/nbloom/fckuploads/file/mujibanedodel.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://optimus.org.au/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16080490a4da1b---xusivowomuziwekam.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.dramayaramendes.com.br/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16073952e51b82---69412021256.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/1eyvgo/aqOO/~3/GLLx1DTH0VQ/uplcv?utm_term=yeti+clash+of+clans+attackPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000fc4b.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFC4B 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_01_sfnt_off0001145d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1145D 16884 bytes
SHA-256: 2c3419a867290f630487df90185e4be8a3e0a36eeb3cd5cdf0be2a6fb89db16c
font_02_sfnt_off0001405d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1405D 10408 bytes
SHA-256: 57c0e6ba68d8377b7c9045c22708ead129da0eee7509ce4e7d35920e9db2d7a1