Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 349ffc069a076e0f…

MALICIOUS

RTF

48.8 KB Created: 2018-02-17 08:09:00 First seen: 2018-03-04
MD5: 7d41e4ade24fe1b680522dd488bd27bb SHA-1: c5cf940647efa503335d8e4e475f458c8ca5498c SHA-256: 349ffc069a076e0f69516cc8fc4e3535192d5f84685966981583c15649fbf9ef
282 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file exploits CVE-2017-0199, a known vulnerability in MSXML SAX, to automatically download and execute a remote file. The targeted URL is http://benfodil.ddns.net/a.rtf, which likely serves as the initial stage of a multi-stage attack. The document body contains a lure for a remote work opportunity, aiming to trick the user into opening the malicious RTF file.

Heuristics 7

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • CVE-2017-0199 (OLE2Link / remote URL Moniker) critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    RTF contains a URL Moniker OLE link whose decoded target is remote. Office can fetch and process the response through the CVE-2017-0199 OLE2Link attack path, but the server-side content type is not proven statically.
  • ClamAV: Rtf.Exploit.CVE_2017_0199-6335035-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Rtf.Exploit.CVE_2017_0199-6335035-0
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml In RTF body
    • http://benfodil.ddns.net/a.rtfIn RTF body
    • http://benfodil.ddns.net/b.rtfIn RTF body

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000039ac.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x39AC 3202 bytes
SHA-256: 3bac4b1c7f1c3375b549556c2524de44dab433825de6e159697c088c1934f965
objdata_01_off000056c7.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x56C7 3202 bytes
SHA-256: 3a6af04a031e39d1058f20b53010d3f28ee7fb7f7f5f10698e6a4c76ef21b8b2

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