Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 34850748aff0ba72…

MALICIOUS

PDF

36.0 KB Created: 2020-08-20 00:48:08 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 107ee08a300b59332b6215e2d99c4a33 SHA-1: ad2c7eb1000c0289be94cb83c6faa771374d1739 SHA-256: 34850748aff0ba72361930bf43b8e3a6c5d5755ec9a7461ed8d5b0ba17e0eb0b
128 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF file contains a critical heuristic firing indicating it links to known malicious redirector infrastructure. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains a URL that appears to be part of this malicious redirection chain. The presence of a 'download button' heuristic further supports the lure mechanism. The primary malicious IOC is the redirector URL, which is likely used to funnel victims to a malicious site.

Heuristics 4

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.ru/pify?keyword=xamarin+android+emulator++mac
    • http://majijivo.nilespiecemakers.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131483281/movugawomuza_jukugujosemuj.pdf
    • http://weweliw.beadsintheforest.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814328/feguti.pdf
    • http://files.firstchristiansalemva.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379706/24de0efd459da.pdf
    • http://files.incitecompany.org/uploads/1/3/0/7/130740623/4933876.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/9729/2967/files/aapc_cpc_exam_questions_and_answers.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/2739/8807/files/75895020345.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/7680/3990/files/lodefiz.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/3141/3404/files/77761958334.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0440/2236/6366/files/51420510134.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0438/3889/8333/files/jajamunudumekejatalimefu.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/78539107281.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0427/9474/6023/files/15627092128.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/3251/8555/files/bed_sheet_size_chart_australia.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/0693/4688/files/wuwudikemabomakutija.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000509a.bin
fe71ece31c0950621a76ebf9cf4e5181661d9f87bc3b781cb07e4b94441b5a54
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x509A 4884 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000610d.bin
51e8feaa3853c4e0009948781e860eb5924e97709f0b0c190862d91d3b4ea505
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x610D 10052 bytes