Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 346fa15b03137ac1…

MALICIOUS

PDF

374.1 KB Created: 2008-11-27 10:13:45 Authoring application: PScript5.dll Version 5.2.2 (via GPL Ghostscript 8.15)
MD5: f26edd98947295ee841caed096152e79 SHA-1: 3774832c128cde2ddf488fabc0cb1a732af51a60 SHA-256: 346fa15b03137ac1634450e699a155dbb6747d4e13e967149524c73e792d4cdb
516 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

This PDF file contains a critical PDF_LAUNCH heuristic firing, indicating it attempts to execute a command. Further analysis reveals a hidden ZIP payload containing an executable named 'sas.exe', and a PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND heuristic targeting 'cmd.exe'. The CVE_2010_1240 heuristic confirms exploitation of a known Adobe Reader vulnerability for command execution. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent, likely to download and execute a second-stage payload.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 12

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Hidden ZIP payload with executable entries inside PDF stream critical PDF_HIDDEN_ZIP_EXECUTABLE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded ZIP archive whose local headers name executable payload files. This is not a normal PDF attachment (/EmbeddedFile); it hides Windows payloads inside an ordinary stream, a strong malware-loader or smuggling pattern.
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\sample.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • PDF paints image(s) but contains no text operators info PDF_IMAGE_ONLY_LURE
    PDF has 1 image XObject(s) and the content stream contains no text-emitting operators (BT/ET, Tj, TJ, ', ") in either raw bytes or decompressed streams — this is the screenshot-as-PDF pattern used to bypass text-based scanners and to deliver instructions purely through rendered pixels. It is informational unless paired with invisible links or risky URI context.

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
sample.pdf
9ad323b95112e72c7a8eacb9cad47257bf27da4d92e61f9747171d10c276e8d0
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 24 at offset 0x7C31 659096 bytes
javascript_obj0025_000.js
e0ab7dc0ebfad6d0bd11d9d7fd7a34e80e3977e3d114c0ca19ea3d2b663a4f24
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 25 at offset 0x5D429 55 bytes
stream_002_off000049a6.bin
a88a872c28d831a3e607cc2f6fe087e765b9b74ceb697fa9b63fc35ea88b6012
decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x49A6 25900 bytes
hidden_pdf_zip_off0009b181.zip
0cd18f248c1402e82dfa2f89f5ba8216615eae0f0b1cc6c0c7c66941c4043a26
pdf-hidden-zip PDF decompressed stream ZIP payload at offset 0x9B181 55624 bytes