MALICIOUS
516
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File
T1059.003 Windows Command Shell
T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment
This PDF file contains a critical PDF_LAUNCH heuristic firing, indicating it attempts to execute a command. Further analysis reveals a hidden ZIP payload containing an executable named 'sas.exe', and a PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND heuristic targeting 'cmd.exe'. The CVE_2010_1240 heuristic confirms exploitation of a known Adobe Reader vulnerability for command execution. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent, likely to download and execute a second-stage payload.
Machine Learning
- Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000
Heuristics 12
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Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
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Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCHPDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
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Hidden ZIP payload with executable entries inside PDF stream critical PDF_HIDDEN_ZIP_EXECUTABLE_PAYLOADPDF stream bytes contain an embedded ZIP archive whose local headers name executable payload files. This is not a normal PDF attachment (/EmbeddedFile); it hides Windows payloads inside an ordinary stream, a strong malware-loader or smuggling pattern.
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Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOADPDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
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/Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMANDPDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\sample.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
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Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCHAn /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
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ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTIONClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
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/Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JSPDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
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JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPTPDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
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Embedded JS stream low PDF_JSPDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
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Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDEDPDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
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PDF paints image(s) but contains no text operators info PDF_IMAGE_ONLY_LUREPDF has 1 image XObject(s) and the content stream contains no text-emitting operators (BT/ET, Tj, TJ, ', ") in either raw bytes or decompressed streams — this is the screenshot-as-PDF pattern used to bypass text-based scanners and to deliver instructions purely through rendered pixels. It is informational unless paired with invisible links or risky URI context.
Extracted artifacts 4
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
sample.pdf9ad323b95112e72c7a8eacb9cad47257bf27da4d92e61f9747171d10c276e8d0 |
pdf-embedded-file | PDF EmbeddedFile object 24 at offset 0x7C31 | 659096 bytes |
javascript_obj0025_000.jse0ab7dc0ebfad6d0bd11d9d7fd7a34e80e3977e3d114c0ca19ea3d2b663a4f24 |
pdf-javascript-stream | PDF /JS object 25 at offset 0x5D429 | 55 bytes |
stream_002_off000049a6.bina88a872c28d831a3e607cc2f6fe087e765b9b74ceb697fa9b63fc35ea88b6012 |
decompressed-pdf-stream | PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x49A6 | 25900 bytes |
hidden_pdf_zip_off0009b181.zip0cd18f248c1402e82dfa2f89f5ba8216615eae0f0b1cc6c0c7c66941c4043a26 |
pdf-hidden-zip | PDF decompressed stream ZIP payload at offset 0x9B181 | 55624 bytes |
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