Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 346ca4873a86e3a4…

MALICIOUS

RTF

81.6 KB First seen: 2024-07-28
MD5: 62183d596b9cfb53ecb7626260a7434f SHA-1: 94c2ce800ed6dd00aa5207ee6e6835b44c370f64 SHA-256: 346ca4873a86e3a46e77040a4d0d487aea29720b3a10712ce0363141b73ec5cb
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The presence of \objdata and \objupdate heuristics strongly indicates exploitation of this component. This technique is commonly used to achieve arbitrary code execution, typically to download and run a second-stage malicious payload.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000084a.bin
32439d7996d5caed63f4e6cc4331f9f087cf9f4d40130e8478d7000c085c1fac
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x84A 1772 bytes