Dridex — Office (OLE) / .XLS malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 346a5f545abd67c8…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

706.5 KB Created: 2021-01-13 17:33:03 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel
MD5: 77e05d6f0c417328a50a29af170e1efd SHA-1: 3167568a7dcef3faba0a4636ff71f2844d6d8962 SHA-256: 346a5f545abd67c879755d34f5985f038b30704d97ed59b5597d9dc251336080
142 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Dridex · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell

The ClamAV detection and heuristics indicate this is a dropper for the Dridex banking trojan. The VBA auto-execution routine, specifically using GetObject, suggests an attempt to run malicious code. Although VBA macros could not be extracted, the presence of numerous unknown URLs strongly implies a secondary payload download and execution chain.

Heuristics 5

  • ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Dridex-9845759-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.Dridex-9845759-0
  • Reference to Windows Script Host high SC_STR_WSCRIPT
    Reference to Windows Script Host
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Unsupported Office format for VBA extraction info OFFICE_FORMAT_UNSUPPORTED
    olevba could not extract VBA macros (AssertionError); format-agnostic byte-level scans still ran. Likely legacy, encrypted, or malformed OLE/OOXML — re-scanning the same bytes will yield the same outcome.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://www.testsurver.nl/everything/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/zuUDqJvjLWS.php
    • http://farabiit.xyz/sofomart/wp-includes/js/mediaelement/renderers/ZJR1EGiQKMGT.php
    • https://dev.unitedwebgroup.com/jimmychesterfield.com/wp-includes/SimplePie/Decode/HTML/bAn3295lG3oxSND.php
    • http://www.sarcars.in/wp-includes/js/tinymce/themes/inlite/Fj1Me7I5aqhuT.php
    • https://www.bloggingtag.com/wp-includes/js/tinymce/plugins/charmap/B3w9zcmN.php
    • https://travelspyders.com/wp-content/plugins/cartflows/theme-support/astra/ZaUT8RbcNuB7.php
    • https://sma.shardanovelty.co.in/vendor/psr/log/Psr/Log/kXNcyAm11boPD0d.php
    • https://webinlavorazione.it/HjU8tH3k.php
    • http://kurdcoding.com/RokUoZsNpAt8mc.php
    • http://sefinancer.fr/wp-content/themes/twentynineteen/sass/blocks/SlyOzj2S7kfU8q.php
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform

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