Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 34632ce4e24c5a7c…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

52.5 KB First seen: 2022-08-13
MD5: 1ec8cec3c21d268ec80339826bcf9594 SHA-1: f8b0ace0160d5cbc6ccd8450cedb592a8dc0414c SHA-256: 34632ce4e24c5a7c82bd9027173ae67c1367af13dbe77c277120e42b23ceb4ec
142 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is a password-encrypted Office document that leverages the CVE-2017-0199 vulnerability. This vulnerability allows it to act as a remote loader, fetching and executing a secondary payload from the embedded URL 'http://jmcglone.com@192.210.149.222/www_www/https_d/www.doc'. The document's encrypted nature and the exploit carrier shape indicate it's designed to conceal and deliver malicious content.

Heuristics 5

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office document is password-encrypted medium OFFICE_ENCRYPTED_PACKAGE
    OLE container holds MS-OFFCRYPTO encrypted package (Standard Encryption (Office 2007, AES)).
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://jmcglone.com@192.210.149.222/www_www/https_d/www.doc