Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 344e937153381157…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

1.29 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-09-26
MD5: d9989db7ad4ffcef273fce28cefca62c SHA-1: 0e59baeb2575c53881793d0d856795a8d4b4d69f SHA-256: 344e937153381157df78c0df987f715038da6d3b771f1dd4ac4168025a3e9221
272 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1204.001 Malicious Link: Malicious Link T1566 Phishing T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter

The file contains an embedded Equation Editor object that exploits CVE-2017-11882. This object contains a secondary PDF payload which, in turn, has a direct link to an executable or archive. The VBA macros are empty, indicating the exploit is likely within the OLE object itself. The embedded PDF also exhibits suspicious static findings and parser evasion techniques.

Heuristics 8

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • PDF link points directly to executable/archive payload critical PDF_DIRECT_PAYLOAD_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) URI whose path ends in an executable, script, shortcut, disk image, or archive extension. Documents can legitimately link to installers, so this is a high-risk delivery indicator rather than a standalone exploit fingerprint.
  • Clickable PDF combines external action with parser-evasion structure high PDF_ACTION_PARSER_EVASION
    PDF has an external clickable URI together with object graph or xref structures that make parsers disagree, such as divergent duplicate objects, parser divergence, or xref offset mismatch. That combination is stronger than a plain link: the document is both an outward-action carrier and a parser-confusion/evasion sample.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://https://www.google.co.in/example.com
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/

Extracted artifacts 7

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
ole10native_00.bin
26b23cca258ff7005917a3e52cd1c8e8a1658fbaf5ac3428b8a1e4cea3a9b85f		 ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD000CC4A9/oLe10nAtIVE 1629 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off0006f800.pdf
1ebc979eefb1bc03f4a623e54be35755d937bc5e91b1deab06c2e8e7e1f8a1fe		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x6F800 892928 bytes
stream_004_off00005f60.bin
2998a126f4fa11ceb265371a5f7968ec18bc4692a32631a544232dc74040021f		 decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x5F60 252488 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00001000.pdf
e77f98d0801c0784679ca7f26d1d8b1c073bac097c5931d5a67da31fc90029f3		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x1000 1345536 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00006600.pdf
efda4ba40a07a129646eb8f2ac377bfe87b8ab201cbadc2aae5e26b932d6d8c3		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x6600 1323520 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00029600.pdf
ae966d3e6aa5b5c2cee84910b98c0dc269899cdc3e96f23f67d049326298fb84		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x29600 1180160 bytes

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