Malicious Office (OLE) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 344535fe21e64b92…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOC

659.5 KB
MD5: 0a01054b14070dbdd34e858b9069ba4f SHA-1: eb55c8072951568ff3d95062270b6db5b81cbbe7 SHA-256: 344535fe21e64b92275e41ffb2c7117629906526a5493d690bd818704d5dbc43
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample is a password-encrypted Office document containing an Equation Editor OLE object, a known carrier for exploits. This combination strongly suggests exploitation of a vulnerability within the Equation Editor to achieve arbitrary code execution.

Heuristics 4

  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Default-encrypted OOXML embedded OLE object xl/embeddings/oleObject1.bin contains the Equation Editor CLSID, the legacy component exploited by CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0802, and CVE-2018-0798.
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office document is password-encrypted medium OFFICE_ENCRYPTED_PACKAGE
    OLE container holds MS-OFFCRYPTO encrypted package (Standard Encryption (Office 2007+, AES-128)).
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.