Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3440ad0f258cd5f2…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

1.64 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel
MD5: 58e3b6511d10de3c6e9c865d398989b3 SHA-1: 24891d62f92bc3e6213f9632caa19c1f2a9e3e61 SHA-256: 3440ad0f258cd5f2e64a9c42160450f37e2ab1f9d3b7fb405a4af4d533775089
134 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The critical heuristic firing for CVE_2017_0199 indicates the sample is designed to exploit this vulnerability to download a remote payload from the URL 'https://getabre.com/HRAIGj'. The presence of a secondary embedded PDF with suspicious static findings further supports a multi-stage attack. The VBA macros are present but contain no executable statements, suggesting they are not the primary execution vector.

Heuristics 6

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • PDF paints image(s) but contains no text operators info PDF_IMAGE_ONLY_LURE
    PDF has 2 image XObject(s) and the content stream contains no text-emitting operators (BT/ET, Tj, TJ, ', ") in either raw bytes or decompressed streams — this is the screenshot-as-PDF pattern used to bypass text-based scanners and to deliver instructions purely through rendered pixels. It is informational unless paired with invisible links or risky URI context.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://getabre.com/HRAIGj
    • http://evertype.comhttp://tulrich.comCopyright
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2006/metadata/longProperties
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/customXml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2006/metadata/contentType
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2006/metadata/properties/metaAttributes
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2006/metadata/properties
    • http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/sharepoint/v3
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2006/documentManagement/types
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/package/2006/metadata/core-properties
    • http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://purl.org/dc/terms/
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/internal/2005/internalDocumentation
    • http://dublincore.org/schemas/xmls/qdc/2003/04/02/dc.xsd
    • http://dublincore.org/schemas/xmls/qdc/2003/04/02/dcterms.xsd
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLRupakaraRegularRupakara

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
font_00_sfnt_off00001575.bin
41c2901ebda5b5d79d4a68e71278578ac4fe004bea942385b0ed0c502c07b584		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1575 88240 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00001000.pdf
5945e8cb3a9b34dec97b9cc3d2ace1f97adea9b6a3aa57a16ad189e1005ae392		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x1000 1715200 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00013200.pdf
0fb9bc323a95a989d8f49001bb6647255d8263dd227855c473d701720584fe87		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x13200 1640960 bytes

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