Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 34398bc40be3279a…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

19.1 KB
MD5: 15d85f394d758c3f971d541d5eb5c1da SHA-1: 9d63c32e7a6da1283c5f26fd23e9baac83315f56 SHA-256: 34398bc40be3279a9d8f5db4197c5ef98475cbca9bfcb23257e06d5bda55c107
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object that triggers CVE-2017-11882 through the Equation Editor. This exploit allows for arbitrary code execution, likely to download and run a secondary payload. The presence of RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR and CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED heuristics strongly indicates this attack vector.

Heuristics 5

  • Obfuscated Equation Editor ProgID + activation critical CVE related RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID from top-level \objdata hex after nested RTF junk groups are ignored, and the document also contains \objemb plus \objupdate activation. This is an obfuscated Equation Editor exploit surface associated with CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 families, but no exact malformed MTEF CVE primitive was recovered from this object.
  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000e5d.bin
9cd82c2b206d2520c55272bdb872934c17afa29855fb42886dc7e763ec6d1e68
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xE5D 1719 bytes