Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 342d02aea1bb2845…

MALICIOUS

PDF

95.0 KB Created: 2021-09-12 22:08:19 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-14
MD5: 4d8cf2e5136f33fe3dd9f4f757377925 SHA-1: 7693aea75dac4857212f63e44e767a88e5255e12 SHA-256: 342d02aea1bb284527e7a8e05d53387eb1dca4e95e345739539682207a1ef290
204 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript

The sample is a PDF document that contains embedded JavaScript and external links. Heuristics indicate it's a browser extension installation lure, a common social-engineering tactic. The embedded JavaScript and numerous external links, some pointing to compromised CMS uploads, suggest the document is designed to trick the user into downloading and executing a malicious payload, likely by masquerading as a necessary update or plugin. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly support its malicious nature.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9897

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Browser extension / update installation lure high SE_BROWSER_INSTALL_LURE
    Document tells the user to install a browser extension, plugin, viewer, or browser update to view content — a common social-engineering path for credential theft and malware installation
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://nomylo.ru/uplcv?utm_term=how+to+tell+if+someone+has+looked+at+your+instagram PDF link annotation
    • http://xn--90ad5ackt1d.xn--p1ai/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/6bc0f6825ec423406cc461b246bf4c25/nowukevomamadokutazew.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.db-ynox.fr/ckfinder/userfiles/files/26021154443.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://synergyproperty.com/images/files/87470064611.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://floridagreatescape.com/media/file/37284986086.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://fuzoku-kyujin.jp/ckfinder/userfiles/files/pugefizuleliw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://antoniolescio.net/userfiles/files/juzisizemamomego.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.insurancedirectcanada.ca/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1613d94fce7d59---rosodof.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://punaide.com/userfiles/files/96953282571.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.reliancecareuk.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/5ec3bc5e462e77482f22bb6071127e80/55395962459.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://merrygoldholidays.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/fuwobujiz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sfasg.jp/js/ckfinder/userfiles/files/xemalaresupuponajivosuda.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://webmedcentralplus.com/userfiles/file/fadivoduwavanilum.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://otohyundaidanang.com/uploads/image/files/libariduwipuropemag.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://safarekhoob.ir/basefile/safarekhoobir/files/84988361877.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cooperspick.com/files/99676256460.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://antik-cafe-bergen.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/161396af5b15d9---tumonijedoxuvexo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://inarchengineering.it/userfiles/files/56584639617.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://neza.cz/UserFiles/File/xikozerinogedebedex.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://journeypeople.cc/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/7de5c854c2163efd25dcb0e56a726993/zivofererekuninelugutufow.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://salamatekhanevadeh.ir/ckeditor/files/files/15777981911.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kzlo.pl/fotki/fotki/file/43245160889.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://systempro.kr/userData/board/file/xazotabaz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dom4m.lv/userfiles/files/53078938896.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://binarbaid.com/public_html/userfiles/file/99800191308.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://riwg.in/userfiles/file/kawogiradapinapobip.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://flylights.pl/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/1oif4l6agsucovcts33ovuigt5/xukugejix.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00010aed.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10AED 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_01_sfnt_off00012304.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12304 11184 bytes
SHA-256: be4e1c200f8202ff6693cfd6a38146c4a7cb445966b2025dbaf02c3765208408
font_02_sfnt_off00013ccc.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x13CCC 18828 bytes
SHA-256: 463cd1c5af1d1f2b78a252acd90805d881d41868854c49b03c7db672b7415e06

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