RTF / .DOC malware analysis — malicious · 342c276200f94a94

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

27.5 KB First seen: 2022-11-15

MD5: cbcae31c8ae21dcc29039c401cc8d33d SHA-1: 758f59f8ab73d3ec3756e2afc7abfdd85b918549 SHA-256: 342c276200f94a94545722474fff99348357ef8f9681600e459687381c2c0846

140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204 Malicious Link T1059.005 Visual Basic

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, indicating an attempt to exploit the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882). The ".objupdate" directive forces OLE activation, and the document body contains a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing'. This combination suggests the document is designed to exploit this vulnerability to deliver a secondary payload.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00004f7f.bin` `f124cad2ad4d38fd17c3952b0615f9ba36074109834561b8307622ad76c2a411`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x4F7F	1720 bytes

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