Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 340eb23cca164805…

MALICIOUS

PDF

89.2 KB Created: 2021-09-19 14:07:04 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-26
MD5: fe8067259c83960bbd76f59595a04005 SHA-1: 0e639f44520d789914a3fef8ad2f1d7f48501782 SHA-256: 340eb23cca16480523e46016604394e3eece819a2525f3368dfb63cad4c63bb4
284 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

This PDF file exhibits multiple high-severity heuristics indicating malicious intent, including ML classification and ClamAV detection. It contains embedded JavaScript and links to external URLs, some of which are hosted on compromised CMS platforms or disposable domains, suggesting it's part of a phishing campaign. The document's structure and heuristics point towards a lure for MFA or one-time code harvesting, likely to steal credentials or session tokens, and it also suggests a password-protected archive handoff, a common technique to evade gateway scanning.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9973

Heuristics 10

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • PDF link to algorithmically-generated URL high PDF_RANDOM_URL_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) link whose host looks algorithmically generated (pronounceable-random labels) and whose path/query carries a long high-entropy token. This is the randomized-redirector pattern of malspam phishing lures — the visible document is only a prompt — not a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • MFA / one-time-code harvesting lure high SE_MFA_LURE
    Document asks for a one-time code, authenticator approval, or MFA confirmation — consistent with credential phishing kits that steal session tokens or abuse multi-factor authentication
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://pistant.ru/uplcv?utm_term=android+apps+password+manager PDF link annotation
    • http://solee.cn/ckfinder/userfiles/files/95809692802.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.darrellstuckey.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1613f253fd3fc3---89017036968.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://thegmsbihta.in/userfiles/file/46315068354.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.solucionaesp.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/30644941415.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://akbmodel.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/161322761d7f20---kosugopazopijosilevafapap.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://oldmotorsclub.com/files/file/mixusipowenigozos.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ebara.com.hk/ckfinder/Zenith/userfiles/files/nomagoxipogeduxifuvajemo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://hodoan.net/userfiles/file/wajebew.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.fattyweng.com.sg/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/161398402683d6---xafolasobira.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://lncxjzxxw.com/upload_fck/file/2021-9-11/20210911191239223608.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://imapcb.org/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/81bcc76fffa68ee4e38f8613c8c1f3b5/xitumafujebedi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ecohort.com/userfiles/files/43011181324.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://realimpacto.com.br/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1614164628f524---32032244276.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.sunarnuricomuisvealisverismerkezi.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/jf2ku444abr4loods7o4nrp5n4/mevebivabopakaxixuxeku.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://commandhousecreations.com/uploads/files/selino.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://memorybg.net/app/templates/js/ckfinder/userfiles/files/33142308.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://netcsemege.hu/ckfinder/userfiles/files/zusozepodukawakuxukevemeb.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://flirdining.com/uploads/files/34310907000.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://tiwtactic.com/userfiles/files/91247314398.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sirikulsteel.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16143933f47dab---56539046869.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://e-midas.ro/files/file/boputuxijubojezotose.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sokolzgierz.pl/web/uploads/files/dobapevikivabuselufof.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://uralteplostroy.ru/content/file/kojekafirufus.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://phuwangnam.com/user_file/file/45451480870.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000f9a4.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF9A4 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_01_sfnt_off000111b6.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x111B6 17536 bytes
SHA-256: 8d254061fc630f810fb4d3669f2007e0f6ffac043146200db77525d73927cbe4
font_02_sfnt_off00013f09.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x13F09 10656 bytes
SHA-256: e55533fc1103a479568f1d86f179c7639616125aa7d55729e8453691f92356df

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