Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 340b29d12df56541…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.0 KB
MD5: 314cd7b612a00fe11e5cdf24e78cf70c SHA-1: d0a38a0ac7eef36a5370f5e22a4754f63a2b9854 SHA-256: 340b29d12df56541ea4ebbeff770c9eccdd8647baa5c5c04e7908afd892883fa
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects and specifically triggers the Equation Editor vulnerability. This indicates an attempt to exploit a client execution vulnerability, likely delivered as a spearphishing attachment. The embedded object data is likely a payload designed to be executed by the exploit.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000a6.bin
811011b8821d272d275487503ed6e1df237116d97702b8bb02ba0290774f3ef0
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xA6 1520 bytes