Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36962 — PDF malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 340a9d595eae5d43…

MALICIOUS

PDF

13.3 KB
MD5: 8ea1e149fe9ad0f786c31b88cd0586d1 SHA-1: fd1c891af7d008e4cd5f10f3ff7c6aebd7735d1b SHA-256: 340a9d595eae5d4337ed1b4fa06ce28a59991e292f0c7d80ffb7eb585dd88474
116 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36962 · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is identified as malicious by ML classifiers and ClamAV, specifically as Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36962. It contains embedded files and an XFA form, indicating an attempt to exploit PDF vulnerabilities for client execution. The presence of embedded files suggests it likely downloads and executes a second-stage payload.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9996

Heuristics 5

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36962 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36962
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • XFA form low PDF_XFA
    PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
  • AcroForm button with action trigger low PDF_ACROFORM_BUTTON
    PDF contains a /Btn form field together with a SubmitForm/URI/Launch/JS trigger — this is the building block of fake 'Download' or 'Open' button overlays used in PDF phishing lures
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-locale-set/2.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xdp/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xci/1.0/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-template/2.2/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-data/1.0/

Extracted artifacts 5

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_file_obj0041.bin
c06dcd026a7ea0536b63e07ce688691b585339a3ab7ff59065e546b56308c7bb		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 41 at offset 0x27A3 85 bytes
embedded_file_obj0042.bin
dda0835df994b8be920f715db36452f6cee7bb42bbc9c897f878a7b298ba8e91		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 42 at offset 0x2855 1029 bytes
embedded_file_obj0043.bin
cc9bf9b4bff960fcc875cced8773f18df40c06e7a9fe9a44ed7dafd435f6cc72		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 43 at offset 0x2A6E 1866 bytes
embedded_file_obj0044.bin
3dd68f00f4fcb366a2a3a17c65cb2626eeddf5ea5713302d374310561d810169		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 44 at offset 0x2EC6 144 bytes
embedded_file_obj0045.bin
10c03f88a5f0a0833dc5b2c8ac295b3a3c6f65e23889eb8cc1dc6fe29bf7f275		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 45 at offset 0x2F72 77 bytes

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