Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 33d926d8284d38fe…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

174.9 KB Created: 2023-06-11 02:09:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 12.0000 First seen: 2023-08-02
MD5: 3315c5db742c60f16f85a14f81ad2f37 SHA-1: 1d32a5f4bb85f199801fddeb23114ee4da3814d5 SHA-256: 33d926d8284d38fe097eaab7867baa0fc5214a1eab517807efda4ceab45f0edd
82 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample exhibits high-confidence indicators of remote template injection and external relationship abuse, pointing to a malicious OOXML document. The embedded OLE object and the presence of an unknown external URL suggest the document is designed to fetch and execute a secondary payload. The primary mechanism appears to be leveraging OOXML's ability to reference external resources, likely for malware delivery.

Heuristics 4

  • Remote template injection high OOXML_REMOTE_TEMPLATE
    Document references a remote template URL (https://www.xoxourl.com/EWXLt) — a common remote-template-injection vector used by Hancitor, Emotet and many phishing campaigns. Word can fetch and apply the remote template; macros in that template may execute depending on Office policy and trust state.
  • External relationship medium OOXML_EXTERNAL_REL
    External target in word/_rels/settings.xml.rels: https://www.xoxourl.com/EWXLt
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://www.xoxourl.com/EWXLt
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
e214473c3d9e4358a2d0d82c3f3c3819536b43ce2fbb82c9743bc1e7e64ef4c7
ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 5632 bytes