Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 336aac87470456b0…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

536.4 KB
MD5: 6fdb783d44d61f1ade7f96f70792802e SHA-1: ff29b4136a4ba1ac28bbc6c0474c0c05d6ee0db3 SHA-256: 336aac87470456b0b1d3a4d6072241d269a1400d4d5be49ba983be8a81a89f89
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The RTF document contains multiple OLE objects, including an automatically linked object that forces activation via \objupdate. This technique, combined with the SE_ENABLE_LURE heuristic, indicates the document is designed to trick the user into enabling content execution. The embedded OLE objects are likely used to deliver a secondary payload, though no specific script or executable content was directly extracted for analysis.

Heuristics 6

  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000bb0.bin
078800dd7f26e8c12556403aa9fd6d734ad0631879b3c5da25d82b70a97a5bd8		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xBB0 171558 bytes
objdata_01_off00057e39.bin
9d9bc825f2fa5e0ed8db7dce6823e199ad9c775873472d42887214589f205470		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x57E39 2632 bytes
objdata_02_off000593dc.bin
44deae4627fee3c44f54d5bd10477ec2e17f4c08135f08e2417832e36d10d037		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x593DC 12297 bytes

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