Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 336388b619d18141…

MALICIOUS

PDF

9.5 KB
MD5: 0f213636185b51ebe1b5d290010cd431 SHA-1: 5fd955070986a185cb059114dd6ac9e791bb0b46 SHA-256: 336388b619d1814130d4d93e70eb77f258bbd40fc2a569aa5cc69ec599896d15
126 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript that is obfuscated and designed to be executed. The critical heuristic 'CVE_2007_5659' indicates the use of the 'collab.collectEmailInfo' function, a known method for exploiting vulnerabilities in older PDF readers to launch arbitrary code. The deobfuscated JavaScript is substantial, suggesting it performs complex actions, likely downloading and executing a secondary payload. The presence of multiple JavaScript streams and a hex stager further supports this attack pattern.

Heuristics 6

  • Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Annotation subject callee-key hex JavaScript stager high PDF_ANNOT_SUBJECT_CALLEE_HEX_STAGER
    PDF JavaScript uses syncAnnotScan()/getAnnots() to read an indirect annotation /Subject stream, percent-decodes it through marker replacement, then uses a callee.toString()-derived key to decode and eval the final exploit stage.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • syncAnnotScan annotation-staging primitive low PDF_FOXIT_SYNCANNOTSCAN
    PDF JavaScript calls syncAnnotScan() — a no-op annotation-enumeration primitive used by exploit-kit JavaScript to stage payload reads from annotation /Subject fields before eval(). Not a vulnerable sink itself; rarely seen in legitimate PDFs. (matched in decompressed stream)
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0007_000.js
9f17df95bc71874fe0f2dcb9f0e8f529cdb3604910d27079f2fbde52cabda2a8
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 7 at offset 0x19B 256 bytes
annotation_subject_callee_hex_stage_000.js
df0e07d13a3271a08c8ba293db0e2f369259ed63602ac4f657c5f4192deed771
deobfuscated-js annotation-subject callee-key decoded JavaScript at offset 0x14A 5169 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 5 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
deobfuscated.js
6097a47b9b34fcd60f54e8f92c252b2504817184597cbeb9833febc02e86103e
deobfuscated-js PDF JavaScript deobfuscation pass 44380 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).