Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3361e4e1f5eb4ecd…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

395.0 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2022-11-10
MD5: 5aea8a7e6627615da6ae2e209927a39d SHA-1: 5717e933260c4ef9190e36638aad2886d6c2f7db SHA-256: 3361e4e1f5eb4ecd9910661a4698b20f42e8a79c3e90fde83d542528773d08e8
108 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious File T1204.002 Malicious File: Malicious Attachment T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1059.005 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic

The critical heuristic firing for CVE-2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE indicates the exploitation of a known vulnerability in Microsoft Equation Editor. This vulnerability is commonly used to deliver secondary payloads. Although the VBA macros themselves appear empty of executable statements, the presence of the Equation Editor exploit object strongly suggests an attempt to compromise the user's system.

Heuristics 3

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
ole10native_00.bin
3d1b0ab7b709606d6c0c9307ae79425c0ad0270c577b90f90c365c12d7698fca
ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD01FCFAAD/oLE10native 1540 bytes