Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 33456b620018dd5f…

MALICIOUS

RTF

261.1 KB Created: 2018-07-03 09:28:00 First seen: 2018-12-09
MD5: e507b370764f67144cc781a69981e965 SHA-1: b547b4f7c269a8f7d6b8df59b7eb035faaf68236 SHA-256: 33456b620018dd5f68a6a536804f3da03e87eaf66c356f2b4f8d4d82ddc8866a
262 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects and triggers critical vulnerabilities CVE-2017-11882 and CVE-2017-8759, indicating exploitation for client execution. The embedded URL suggests the download of a secondary payload, likely delivered via spearphishing.

Heuristics 7

  • CVE-2017-11882 — Equation Editor FONT record overflow critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882
    Equation Editor MTEF contains an overlong FONT typeface field, the vulnerable copy primitive for CVE-2017-11882. This is stronger evidence than the Equation Editor CLSID alone because it identifies the malformed record that drives code execution in EQNEDT32.EXE.
  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • ClamAV: Rtf.Dropper.Agent-6848859-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Rtf.Dropper.Agent-6848859-0
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://a.doko.moe/ldbbxq.msi In RTF body
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordmlIn RTF body

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000bf6b.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xBF6B 15672 bytes
SHA-256: b2518ee86918bb6fa546b4d0eaf0f44cbdb7e295c8de89a1f4f444f128883da4

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