Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 331a7ef1493b93a1…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

404.5 KB
MD5: fc390d7b8557d2dc4907c0487d5d4b66 SHA-1: 55459b49899e1d31bd33c389603c40be7792bd6a SHA-256: 331a7ef1493b93a15f714bd7f646da7be0a50cff8fd9c366d2cd20289692ed54
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File

The critical heuristic firing for CVE-2017-0199 indicates the document is designed to exploit a vulnerability in OLE2Link and URL Moniker to load remote content. The OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE heuristic further suggests this is an exploit carrier. The extracted URL is highly suspicious and likely points to the secondary payload. The document is encrypted with a default password, a common tactic to hinder analysis.

Heuristics 3

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
    URL https://n9.cl/fwnn7
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.