Malicious Office (OLE) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 331742a3835a6634…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOC

86.0 KB Created: 2021-08-30 04:48:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word
MD5: 499b2d5a07fbcfbc8a6ec124c14efde7 SHA-1: fedbbc359e03b17bd7866a31283c3ff87cc693e4 SHA-256: 331742a3835a6634e1331be491a789f7e5ddcefc6a30b7965dbf970d214b36d4
182 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell

The sample is a malicious Office document containing VBA macros. The `document_open` macro is configured to execute, and it writes a string to a file named '1.hta'. It then uses `explorer.exe` to execute this HTA file, which is a common technique for downloading and executing further payloads. The heuristic `SE_ENABLE_LURE` indicates the document likely prompts the user to enable macros.

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.BlueOffice08210-9889818-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.BlueOffice08210-9889818-0
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/photoshop/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceEvent#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceRef#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/tiff/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/exif/1.0/
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
f71474651ef3b3aa14f50a2c54c838fc5905d89aa3e6d5bd8de162f2689a64fc
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 690 bytes