Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 33000f1f0be9df2e…

MALICIOUS

PDF

76.3 KB Created: 2021-02-14 17:05:44 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-11
MD5: c00364a51da2fb349d11048e323c5496 SHA-1: 7392b8b981377d1e76c1f3cba31bc5e86dd45ba7 SHA-256: 33000f1f0be9df2e1ec366021032698c07888a828391584af77a57851efaee7d
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains numerous embedded links, with several pointing to known malicious redirectors and disposable hosting. The ML classifier strongly indicated maliciousness. While no scripts were extracted, the structure and link farm behavior suggest an attempt to redirect users to potentially malicious content or phishing sites, likely distributed via spearphishing.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://crophysi.ru/123?utm_term=fire+stick+black+screen+amazon+logo In PDF document text
    • https://pidesetax.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739971/lusukeb.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wamazuwo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131380988/fobituwuvopagoru.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nawivavunof.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134669961/3678019.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kopujigok.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134862339/semidozufutazuje.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/dekaroku/ZjcgcyM/at_t_prepaid_customer_service.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fomilapemarujan.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814088/3a9049.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/foropogajag/geQhhp9/24727030471.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nugilura.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135317706/xubepukokuzefo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://daxajofu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130740026/951276.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/dorodidur/bdu15HI/riders_racing_track.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/jivamubug/zureze.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://besosive.epizy.com/wilton_decorating_tips_guide.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://givosike.rf.gd/booter_website_template.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/lizuseguwix/whatsapp_video_sad_male.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/lovetijif/claro_reportar_telefono_robado.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://fenulujexita.epizy.com/best_emotional_whatsapp_video_status.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://pebeminozari.epizy.com/aiag_full_form.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000ec43.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEC43 5328 bytes
SHA-256: bb831bb1a38902f038c3d8723067ec133e3cd979c901af2156b6d1ac621a3243
font_01_sfnt_off0000fe60.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFE60 11092 bytes
SHA-256: c4b312bc3492aef276eae8fff59df67de0f77a9e235c43618b7fa6158823e8ce

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