Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 32f5c43c220bc021…

MALICIOUS

PDF

76.3 KB Created: 2021-05-07 11:57:23 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: eecd9771e41680ebde4e2e5542b42859 SHA-1: df537a36eee2a26f5bdd744004ac46bce06933a4 SHA-256: 32f5c43c220bc02149d363321a09516b458a5334f8f02501d0cbccb21068f0bf
176 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF document exhibits characteristics of a phishing lure, impersonating a document signing service. It contains multiple external links, with a critical heuristic identifying a link farm pointing to various PDF files. One of the primary URLs, 'https://jumiwimov.ru/strik?utm_term=how+to+insert+signature+in+google+docs+on+ipad', suggests a pretext related to document signing or editing. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent, likely for credential harvesting or further payload delivery.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9996

Heuristics 6

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Document signing service impersonation lure medium SE_DOCUSIGN_LURE
    Document impersonates DocuSign, Adobe Sign, or a similar signing service in a signing-request context
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://jumiwimov.ru/strik?utm_term=how+to+insert+signature+in+google+docs+on+ipad
    • http://show-visitor.xyz/what_does_marginalized_population_meanrvz2y.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4412894/normal_605ac1dca8b20.pdf
    • http://virona.org/182037134957cbry.pdf
    • http://antonioit.fun/foxit_reader_printer_setup6nra0.pdf
    • http://werenntaq.online/how_to_install_hp_officejet_6500_wirelessc8n58.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4373998/normal_604d96b1b24a1.pdf
    • http://finovadi.iblogger.org/6732156252.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/29287f2f-233a-448a-8c2b-be46ce9a2a6f/do_tattoos_fade_away.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/nawuvud/bovuzixatonan.pdf
    • http://zelibigevuloxuj.epizy.com/9297366521.pdf
    • https://c370dac7-4848-4fa0-a6df-94361299e8ba.filesusr.com/ugd/fa6303_836caae9a8404e1a95bc1be726a9e313.pdf?index=true
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/tumasun/bezutevexaxomozowu.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/zarelusipofox/64153138111.pdf
    • http://wexavow.epizy.com/taviluwafom.pdf
    • https://75edee45-cd08-43cb-a752-0c33e5c2343f.filesusr.com/ugd/a7c173_90de73bc2cdb4c589b503040fc8e4112.pdf?index=true
    • https://59bb578d-b312-442a-858b-1a1a54b18a6c.filesusr.com/ugd/c79b1c_1765e5adb7c746deb0258dfd7c7315f0.pdf?index=true
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/gonasidupij/79525987811.pdf
    • http://konemuga.epizy.com/21112124891.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/4b7f291d-faf2-4195-b5db-fbae779a14bc/xuwibidemedegojobobiguwe.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/jenagubadopi/duputa.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/5a6b0b79-2d7e-431e-909f-ad027a4366ff/56821656630.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000de4c.bin
f2350e429021e4e7c2464606c4c55c1c5b66c2c9eab644df7acaa61b6824a5ba
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDE4C 5176 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000f003.bin
6894c2fa3bbeb4a10590cd1d9f97601ee9ce57a3b92df78dd0e8dc35bfa9bf16
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF003 11040 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off00011581.bin
a542ec26cea93e049a2e27cd59b1347dd9bbdea13775fd7b822b3c2b3136116f
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11581 4324 bytes