Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 32db1f58221243c2…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

1.71 MB
MD5: 0b3ef8ddcfa33962bc8cc73342a79842 SHA-1: c04f5aed8c522188b08bdac0ff594ecd83e47577 SHA-256: 32db1f58221243c268f2a4803faa1d67c79018033b93b23eacdde71eaf17f260
220 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains OLE object data and specifically triggers heuristics related to Equation Editor and CVE-2017-11882. The presence of ".objdata" and ".objupdate" sections, along with excessive hex data, indicates an attempt to embed and activate a malicious OLE object. This strongly suggests the exploitation of CVE-2017-11882 to execute a secondary payload.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor OLE1 native payload — CVE-2017-11882 related critical CVE related CVE_2017_11882_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an OLE1 Equation.3 embedded object whose native data is large and payload-like, and \objupdate requests automatic activation. This is the delivery shape used by Equation Editor RCE documents such as CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802, but the malformed MTEF record needed for exact attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • Large hex data blocks in OLE object high RTF_EXCESSIVE_HEX
    RTF contains ~1782KB of hex-encoded data inside \objdata sections — may hide a payload
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001d0f.bin
3cd7464664bf6833bb6c3b61477e3480d155b11ee33c60b50e8d305df896597c		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1D0F 891199 bytes

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