Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 32bdfa2734310ff6…

MALICIOUS

RTF

2.50 MB
MD5: fcd0626f6306a31a49a04cbfaf7e5124 SHA-1: 580b680536b365a2b98dd4680a373c3c427f680c SHA-256: 32bdfa2734310ff6073b9e7528ee443d5031d109b7ae148a4ee395e4965d7a5a
220 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains embedded OLE object data, specifically related to Equation Editor, which strongly indicates exploitation of the CVE-2017-11882 vulnerability. This vulnerability allows for arbitrary code execution, likely to download and run a second-stage payload. The presence of large hex-encoded data blocks further supports the hiding of a malicious payload within the object data.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor OLE1 native payload — CVE-2017-11882 related critical CVE related CVE_2017_11882_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an OLE1 Equation.3 embedded object whose native data is large and payload-like, and \objupdate requests automatic activation. This is the delivery shape used by Equation Editor RCE documents such as CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802, but the malformed MTEF record needed for exact attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • Large hex data blocks in OLE object high RTF_EXCESSIVE_HEX
    RTF contains ~2615KB of hex-encoded data inside \objdata sections — may hide a payload
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000009f.bin
15891b6aa434575112e6d183c1d9006f81f083705aa6c18fe3ce45959d3f03d9		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x9F 871974 bytes

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