Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 329d4b9a80fc6f65…

MALICIOUS

PDF

100.0 KB
MD5: 6626455be5c4238dcaa33b7215541c22 SHA-1: 1e2e8eedccb9416c68f75d65bee83cc1c8d4184a SHA-256: 329d4b9a80fc6f65de570afec859bcdb831950d755dcf2d6d94fce66d1856883
136 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution: Malicious Attachment T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell

This PDF document exploits the CVE-2010-0188 vulnerability in Adobe Reader via an XFA form. The embedded script payload within the XFA form is responsible for executing the exploit. The primary attack vector is the exploitation of a known Adobe Reader vulnerability to deliver a malicious payload.

Heuristics 6

  • Adobe Reader LibTIFF XFA image exploit — CVE-2010-0188 critical CVE likely CVE_2010_0188
    PDF contains the CVE-2010-0188 exploit template: XFA JavaScript heap-spray setup, a generated TIFF image payload, and assignment of that TIFF data to an XFA image field rawValue to trigger Adobe Reader's LibTIFF parser.
  • XFA form contains executable script high CVE related PDF_XFA_SCRIPT
    PDF embeds an XFA form whose dataset contains a <script> or <xfa:script> block — XFA scripting has been the exploit primitive for several Adobe Reader RCEs (CVE-2010-0188 family, CVE-2018-4901, and others). Plain XFA without scripts is far less risky.
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream medium PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an HTML/XFA <script> tag without accompanying Windows shell-execution primitives — common in accessible XFA forms but worth surfacing for analyst review.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • XFA form low PDF_XFA
    PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ns.adobe.com/xdp/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-template/2.5/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-data/1.0/

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_file_obj0008.bin
c058082e3f1ea03e87fabfd09eab2ba801e67adf27e01f479aee373aa410a9ee
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 8 at offset 0xC6 101647 bytes