Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 32891022397f72d2…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

218.2 KB First seen: 2022-02-15
MD5: 5f9fe1dbc14e3e1dbbafc7d7eaefa9ad SHA-1: c113699c00cb4439a6e447a44f47b8d6b18a043f SHA-256: 32891022397f72d288c5949a023d9ecd514450d8116e9138dc03ea40533ae348
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The RTF document contains multiple OLE objects, with specific heuristics indicating the use of composite monikers and objupdate directives to force OLE activation. The document body explicitly prompts the user to 'Enable Editing', a common lure for macro-based malware delivery. While no scripts were directly extracted, the presence of embedded OLE objects and the lure strongly suggest an attempt to execute malicious code upon user interaction.

Heuristics 6

  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000ba2.bin
a96c417b56f55f2b0ba4ced285da6a6709c217d49430fd9f952fe65c7e48ffbe
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xBA2 15570 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 shell/COM execution token(s).
objdata_01_off00008ac2.bin
893d8db8585190a273d0c7c3dcff2eb58184b866a3687a9319ca72a8284876cb
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x8AC2 2632 bytes
objdata_02_off0000a065.bin
44deae4627fee3c44f54d5bd10477ec2e17f4c08135f08e2417832e36d10d037
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xA065 12297 bytes