Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3285d4303cc3cc51…

MALICIOUS

RTF

19.8 KB First seen: 2019-04-18
MD5: f15ad3549c9844d2405221434fde0a03 SHA-1: a7ec3eaaa75dd096603ca1bafebd16f960ce6cbb SHA-256: 3285d4303cc3cc51533205e130fcf238e41cfbfe05ff32649d0bb45089e5a992
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains an embedded OLE object that leverages a known vulnerability in the Equation Editor. The presence of RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR and RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristics indicates that the file is designed to exploit this vulnerability upon opening, likely leading to arbitrary code execution. The embedded OLE object is the primary mechanism for this exploit.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00003e6a.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x3E6A 1734 bytes
SHA-256: 43391a050378701dc81ea41b74d3aae216b764e63336125ab7998626a4df186b